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Ethical Issues, Helps, and Challenges:
Perceptions of U.S. Actuaries
Therese M. Vaughan, Robert W. Cooper, and Garry L. Frank*

Abstract
This paper reports the findings of a survey of Fellows of the Casualty Actuarial
Society (FCAS) to determine their perceptions of the key ethical issues and dilemmas
facing the industry today and the factors they view as most helpful and challenging
in resolving these dilemmas. The responses are compared to a previous survey of
Fellows of the Society of Actuaries (FSA). The study finds that FSAs and FCASs tend
to rank key ethical issues similarly and that both groups of actuaries tend to look first
to their own personal values, second to certain factors in their business environment,
and last to professional factors when resolving ethical dilemmas. Finally, the paper
contains some implications for the actuarial professional associations as they attempt
to assist their members in resolving ethical dilemmas.
Key words: ethics, professionalism

1 Introduction
Recent years have seen significant activity among American
actuarial organizations focused on professionalism. Both the Society
of Actuaries (SOA) and the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) have
instituted admissions courses that include professionalism and
ethics. 1 More recently the organizations have cooperated through the
American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) to create the Actuarial
Board for Counseling and Discipline (ABCD), from which all actuar* Therese M. Vaughan, Ph.D., ASA, ACAS, CPCU, is director of the Insurance Center
at Drake University where she teaches courses in insurance and actuarial science.
Robert W. Coorer, Ph.D., is Employers Mutual Distinguished Professor of Insurance at
Drake UniverSIty. He previously was dean at The American College where he was
responsible for the CLU and ChFC designation programs.
Garry L. Frank, Ph.D. is a professor of public administration at Drake University
where he teaches a course in business ethics.
1 In the case of the CAS, this course must be completed prior to associateship; the SOA
course is required for admission to fellowship.
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ies are encouraged to seek help in matters dealing with professional
conduct. All three organizations have promulgated codes of professional conduct to encourage professionalism and ethical behavior by
their members.
This paper reports the findings of two surveys of Fellows of the
Casualty Actuarial Society eliciting their views on the major ethical
problems today in the property I liability insurance industry and the
factors they find helpful and challenging personally in resolving the
ethical dilemmas they face at work. The surveys replicate previous
surveys of Fellows of the Society of Actuaries conducted by Cooper
and Frank (1992a, 1992b) in February 1991. A comparison of the
results across actuarial groups suggests that the most problematic
ethical issues are similar, as are the factors viewed as most helpful
and challenging. By focusing on the issues of greatest concern and the
factors viewed as most helpful in resolving them, some insights can
be gained into approaches that may be taken by actuarial organizations to assist their members.

2 Methodology
2.1 The Survey Forms
Two survey instruments are used. One measures the perceptions of
Fellows of the Casualty Actuarial Society with respect to ethical
issues and dilemmas important in the property I liability insurance
industry. The other measures the factors that are helpful and challenging in resolving ethical dilemmas. The first survey contains an
itemized list of 34 potential ethical issues (dilemmas); they are presented in Table 1. Issues 8 and 9 are most directly related to the problems of selecting assumptions to use in pricing and reserving and those
encountered when dealing with regulators. The remaining 28 of the
first 30 issues reflect ethical issues and dilemmas facing businesses
and their employees in general. Issues 31 through 34 deal with ethical dilemmas of particular concern to business professionals. Survey
participants are asked to rate each of the 34 statements on a five
point scale, where a 5.0 means that it is a major ethical problem in
the property I liability insurance industry and a 1.0 means that it is
not a problem. In addition to rating the 34 issues presented in Table 1,
respondents are asked to indicate what they feel is the most important specific ethics problem facing those who work in the industry
today. Finally, survey participants are asked to provide some demographic information, including how many years they have been mem-
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services of the highest quality in the
eyes of the customer

~

FCASEmployees
Mean
Rating
Rank

FCASConsultants
Mean
Rating
Rank

FSAEmployees
Mean
Rating
Rank

FSAConsultants
Mean
Rating
Rank

S.

2.667

2.947

2.78

2.90

iil

»

()

2

~
~
IJ

2

3

4

4

$l

Issue 2

o·
(J)

Failure to provide prompt, honest
responses to customer inquiries and
requests

2.488

6

2.827-

5

2.68

6

2.72

7

Making disparaging remarks about
competitors, their products, or their
employees or agents

1.940

16

1.987

21

2.63-

8

2.52#

10

Issue 4

Misuse of proprietary information

1.810

23

2.079--

19

1.88

21

1.77

26

Issue 5

Misuse of sensitive information
belonging to others

1.786

24

2.053

20

1.76

Z1

1.85

24

Improper methods of gathering
competitors' information

1.643

Z1

1.882

25

1.83

22

1.75

28

False or misleading representation of
products or services in marketing,
advertising, or sales efforts

2.309

10

2.553

9

3.61-

Issue 3
-...j

Issue 6
Issue 7

3.60#

<

Q.
Issue 8

Issue 9

Responding to pressure from clients
and/or management to change
assumptions used in pricing or
reserving

3.277

Misrepresenting information provided
to regulators

2.512

Z

3.5924

2.829

4

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

!J
_1'0

co
co
w

<

III
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TABLE 1 (continued)
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Failure to identify the customer's
needs and recommend products and
services that meet these needs
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Failure to be objective with others in
one's business dealings
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limitations in one's abilities to provide
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Pearson correlation coefficients:
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bers of the CAS and their level within their company (senior manager, middle manager, or nonmanagement).
The second survey deals with potential helps and challenges in
responding to ethical dilemmas. The survey lists the 16 potential
helps and 18 potential challenges found in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Again, respondents are asked to rate these on a five point
scale. For the helps, a 5.0 means the factor is extremely helpful and
a 1.0 means it is not helpful. For the challenges, a 5.0 means it presents a significant challenge and a 1.0 means it does not present a
challenge. Respondents also are permitted to indicate NA if the
helps or challenges are not available or not applicable. Two openended questions ask the respondents to indicate other factors they
find helpful in resolving ethical dilemmas and other factors that
present ethical challenges. Finally, the survey collects demographic
information on the number of years the respondent had been a member
of the CAS, how long he or she has worked for the current employer,
and his or her level within the company.
Both of these surveys are nearly identical to the surveys of FSAs
conducted by Cooper and Frank in February 1991. (Minor changes are
made to incorporate issues, helps, and challenges that are likely to
be relevant for casualty actuaries.) This makes it possible to compare
the FSA and FCAS group responses and draw conclusions about their
similarities and differences.

2.2 The Samples
The Casualty Actuarial Society supplied two sets of mailing
labels for actuaries practicing in the U.S.: 504 property I liability
company employees and 248 consultants. It is possible that the ethical dilemmas viewed as important may differ between actuaries
employed at insurance companies (which would tend to be larger
companies) and those consulting (primarily to smaller companies);
therefore, the issues survey was mailed to both company employees
and consultants. The helps and challenges survey was mailed only to
a sample of company employees. 2
Sending the helps and challenges survey only to company employees while sending
the issues survey to both company employees and consultants was done for several rea sons. First, given the limited number of FCAS consultants available to survey, the
design focused on identifying differences in perceptions of issues by employees and consultants, which both intuition and previous ethics research suggest are more likely to
differ for the two groups than are helps and challenges. Second, the design replicates
the design of the earlier FSA studies (which reflects discussion with the staff of the
SOA) and thus permits comparison between the two groufs of actuaries in this paper.
The FCAS study split the company employee group-hal received the issues survey,
and half received the helps and challenges survey. The consultant group only received
2
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Survey forms were mailed in July 1993. Responses were returned
by 84 of the 252 company employees receiving the issues survey (33
percent) and 76 of the 248 consultants (31 percent). The helps and
challenges survey generated responses from 112 of the 252 company
employees that received it (44 percent).3

3 Findings
3.1 FCAS Groups: Perception of Issues
Table 1 provides the mean ratings for each of the 34 ethical
issues based on the individual ratings given to each issue by all
respondents, with separate results reported for employees and consultants. The table also shows the rank of each issue based on the size
of the issue's mean rating relative to the size of the other issue
means for the same group of actuaries. For example, Issue 1 (failure to
provide products and services of the highest quality in the eyes of
the customer) is rated 2.667 on average by the respondents in the
FCAS company employee group and has the second highest issue
mean rating for that group.
Only one issue received a mean rating of over 3.0-Issue 8,
responding to pressure from clients and/or management to change
assumptions used in pricing or reserving. This issue is ranked number
one by both the company employees and consultants. While the other
issues have mean ratings less than 3.0, the percentage of respondents
indicating 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0 for an issue suggests that many of the issues
present ethical problems for rather substantial percentages of those
in the industry.
The FCAS company employee and consultant groups rank the
same six issues as the major ones facing the property/liability insurance industry (although they are in slightly different order in each
group). The consultants rate an additional issue (Issue 34) as tied for
sixth place. These seven issues and their relative rankings for FCAS
employees and consultants are:

the issues survey. Each of the surveys was reviewed by representatives of the CAS or
SOA.
3 These response rates are somewhat lower than the FSA response rates. In that case,
48 percent of company employees and 46 percent of consultants responded to the issues
survey, and 41 percent responded to the helps and challenges survey. While there are
no obvious explanations for the differences In response rates, it should be noted that
the CAS had just conducted an extensive survey of its membership when the current
survey was mailed.

1?
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a) Responding to pressure from clients and/ or management to change
assumptions used in pricing or reserving (1, 1).4
b) Failure to rrovide products and services of the highest quality in
the eyes 0 the customer (2, 3).
c) Failure to identify the customer's needs and recommend products
and services that meet these needs (3, 2).
d) Misrepresenting information provided to regulators (4, 4).
e) Lack of knowledge or skills to competently perform one's duties
(4, 6).
f) Failure to provide prompt, honest responses to customer inquiries
and requests (6, 5).
g) Misrepresenting or concealing limitations in one's abilities to provide services (8, 6).
Issue 27, office/agency closings and layoffs, ranks relatively high
for company employees (and not for consultants). Recent restructuring
in the property/liability industry and the effects of the soft market
evidently are leaving their effects.
Statistically significant differences 5 between the company
employee and consultant groups are reported for four of the seven topranked issues (Issues 2, 8, 32, 34). For these four issues (which deal
with consumer/client problems) the consultant mean ratings are
higher than the employee ratings, perhaps reflecting the consultants'
greater contact with clients and others outside the firm. The apparent importance of these differences diminishes, however, when one
examines the correlation coefficient for the mean ratings of the 34
issues, 0.9450. 6 This high correlation indicates that the order of the
issues is similar for the two groups?
For example, (2,3) means FCAS employees rank the issue second, while FCAS consultants rank the same issue third.

4

t-tests are used to test for differences in means throughout the paper. F statistics are
calculated to test for equality in variances. In most cases the variances are not found to
be different, so pooled variance t-tests are used in these cases. Where differences in
the variances are found, a separate variance t-test is used. The possibility of response
bias exists because of the somewhat small response rates (not atypical of this type of
study).
5

The numbers reported in the text of this paper are the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients. Because the tables also include ranks, the Spearman rank order correlation coefficients also are calculated and reported in the tables.

6

Little difference is found among actuaries at different organization levels with
respect to their order of the issues. All groups rank Issue 8 first. The correlation coefficient for the mean ratings is 0.9354 for senior manager and middle manager company
employees and 0.9037 for senior manager and middle manager consultants. The order of
issues is somewhat less similar, however, for nonmanagerial personnel and managers
for the consultant survey.
7
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As expected, the actuaries rate those issues most closely related
to selecting assumptions in pricing and reserving and dealing with
regulators among the highest (Issues 8 and 9).8 Evidence of the
importance with which actuaries view these issues is found in the
responses to the open-ended question asking for the most important
ethical problem facing those working in the industry. Several
responses deal with the current regulatory environment, which is considered, as one respondent termed it, "too political." Respondents
raised concerns about dealing with consumer advocates and regulators
who do not follow professional standards of practice. One respondent
stated "Unethical rate suppression leads to unethical support for rate
filings."
The remaining five issues identified by the respondents as presenting the greatest ethical problems to the industry combine business
and professional ethics issues. Two are related to the ethical responsibilities of businesses and their employees in general (Issues 1 and
2). The other three are ethical issues of special relevance to professionals (Issues 31, 32, and 34). All four of the professional issues
included in the survey form (Issues 31 through 34) are ranked in the
top ten by both company employees and consultants.
Three of the highest rated issues relate to providing proper service to customers (Issues I, 2, and 32). While these may be viewed as
ethics problems, they are also part of a much broader question of just
how the industry does business. Much has been written about the
industry's poor relations with consumers and the need to provide
quality customer service. 9 Customer service is a major focus of the
total quality management (TQM) movement now fashionable with
the insurance industry (and others). It is not surprising that these
issues are rated highly.

3.2 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Perception of
Issues
Table 1 also shows the issue means and rankings for the earlier
survey of company employee and consultant FSAs (Cooper and Frank
1992b). FCAS Issues 8 and 9 are not in the FSA survey.1 0 The correlaFor a thorough discussion of the ethical dilemmas faced by actuaries in these areas,
see Feldblum (1993).

8

9 See, for example, Roberts (1993) who reports on the proposed creation of a fermanent
quality insurance congress to address the problem of improving the quality 0 the insurance industry, with particular emphasis on improving service.

This is unfortunate because, as one reviewer noted, Issue 8 may be the principal issue
for pension actuaries while Issue 9 is common to all actuaries.

10
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tion coefficient for the mean ratings of common issues for FCAS
employees and FSA employees is 0.8187; for FCAS consultants and
FSA consultants it is 0.8579. Not surprisingly (because these actuaries
are in essentially different industries), these are lower than the
FCAS employee/FCAS consultant correlation coefficient previously
reported.
The top issues, as rated by FSAs and FCASs, however, are similar. With the exception of Issues 8 and 9 (which are not included on
the FSA survey), all of the top seven FCAS issues also are ranked in
the top seven by both the FSA company employees and consultants.
The FSAs (both employees and consultants) give the highest rating to Issue 7 (false or misleading representation of products and services in marketing, advertising, or sales efforts), while the FCASs
rank Issue 8 highest. The importance of Issue 7 in the life insurance
industry likely is driven by a concern over misleading policy illustrations,ll perhaps the life insurance equivalent to the
property /liability problems with pricing and reserving. Both deal
with the fundamental actuarial problem of selecting assumptions to
illustrate or predict the future. Also, in both cases the information
will be used by outside parties (consumers in the life case, regulators
in the property / liabili ty case) .12
The issues ranked second and third by the FCASs (Issues 1 and
32) rank fourth and second for the FSAs. The next two highest rated
issues (of those common to both studies) for the FCASs (Issues 31 and
2) are also in the top seven FSA issues. These issues (two businessrelated and two professional-related) reflect a high degree of concern
about relations with customers and the industry's willingness/ ability
to provide adequate and appropriate products and service.

3.3 FCAS Survey: Helps
Table 2 provides the mean ratings and ranks for the survey's 16
potential helps and the percentage of respondents that indicate each
help is not available or applicable. (NA responses are not included
in the mean ratings.) The potential helps in the survey form are clas11 Cooper and Frank (1992b) report that the survey's 0r.en-ended question elicited
responses focusing heavily on the use of misleading policy Illustrations.

12 Issue 3 (making disparaging remarks about competitors, their products, or their
employees or agents) is Significantly higher in importance for the FSA respondents
than for FCAS respondents. This issue ranks in the top ten for both FSA company
employees and consultants, but is ranked 16 and 21 for FCAS employees and consultants,
respectively. The importance of this issue may reflect the general concern about
marketing-related issues in the life insurance industry; for example, the problem with
policy illustrations.
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sHied into three groups: one's personal attributes/environment (H15
and HI6), business environment (H5 through HI4), and professional
environment (HI through H4). The results indicate that respondents
find a number of these resources helpful in resolving ethical dilemmas encountered in work. Only four of the 16 potential helps have
mean ratings below 3.0 (H2, H4, H6, and H7).
The five factors ranked most helpful to the respondents for
resolving ethical dilemmas encountered in their work are (from
highest to lowest):
a) Personal moral values and standards.
b) The fact that your immediate boss does not pressure you into compromising your ethical standards.
c) Ability to go to your boss for information and advice on ethical
issues.
d) A company environment/culture that does not encourage you to
compromise your ethical values to achieve organizational goals.
e) A company management philosophy that emphasizes ethics in
business operations.
Respondents rate their own personal moral values and standards
most helpful. All of the remaining four major helps relate to the
actuary's work environment. The actuary's immediate boss is a major
source of help (second and third), and the company culture and management philosophy are close behind (fourth and fifth). Two of these
most helpful factors (HID and H13) deal with merely the absence of
pressure to compromise one's own ethical standards. This suggests
that one way companies and managers can assist employees is by neither explicitly nor implicitly pressuring them to go against their
ethical values.
In spite of the fact that the company environment appears to be a
major source of assistance in resolving ethical dilemmas, many
respondents report formal company systems are not available to
them. Thirty-eight percent of respondents report that a program or
department in their company to which they could report unethical
activity (H7) is either not available or not applicable, and 49 percent report company ethics training (H6) as unavailable. Even when
these resources are available, respondents tend to rate them among
the least helpful factors; both have mean ratings below 3.0.
Relatively more helpful is a company code of ethics, which earns a
mean rating of 3.4 but is not available to 14 percent of respondents.
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compromise your ethical values to achieve organizational goals
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4

4

3.91

3

3.1

4.055"

3

3

3.79

4

1.9

H12 Ability to go beyond your boss to higher level managers for information
and advice on ethical issues

3.258
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13

3.21

11

13.7

H13 The fact that your immediate boss does not pressure you into
compromising your ethical standards

4.402"

2

4

4.16

2

1.1

H14 Help from your co-workers in resolving your ethical dilemmas

3.248

11

3

3.23

10

2.3

H15 Your own personal moral values and standards

4.795

0

4.80

H16 Your family and friends who provide support and insight for you in
resolving ethical conflicts

3.706

3

3.75
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Ability to go to your boss for information and advice on ethical issues
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" = significantly greater than the FSA value at the 0.05 level
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Respondents tend to give relatively low ratings to resources provided by the professional societies. Two of the four helps related to
professional resources (HI to H4) receive ratings below 3.0 (H2 and
H4). The Actuarial Board for Counseling and Discipline ranks 15th
out of the 16 helps, possibly because it is relatively new and respondents have had little experience with it. 13 Additional surveys are
necessary to determine more precisely the reason for ABCD's relatively low rank.
To summarize, FCAS company employees tend to look first to personal values, second to certain factors in their business environment,
and last to resources in their profession when resolving ethical
dilemmas. Resources from their profession tend to be viewed as reasonably helpful, but less helpful than most factors in the business
environment. The responses also suggest that businesses should ensure
that managers are equipped to deal with their own ethical dilemmas and those encountered by their subordinates in the course of
work. One of the best things a business can do to encourage ethical
behavior is to refrain from pressuring managers and employees to
compromise their own personal values.

3.4 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Helps
Table 2 also shows the helps ratings and ranks for the earlier
survey of FSAs (Cooper and Frank 1992a). The five most important
helps, as rated by respondents to the FSA survey, are identical to
those found in the FCAS survey. Moreover, they are in virtually the
same order of importance (the exception being HI0 and Hll, which
are reversed in order). The correlation coefficient for mean ratings of
the FCAS and FSA respondents is 0.9838, indicating a high degree of
similarity in the ordering of their responses. The mean ratings of
only two helps (Hll and H13, both of which relate to the respondent's relationship with his or her immediate boss) are significantly
different, with the FCAS ratings higher than the FSA ratings.

3.5 FCAS Survey: Challenges
Table 3 provides mean ratings by the FCAS company employees
for each of the survey's 18 potential challenges and the percentages
that report NA. (NA responses are not included when calculating the
mean ratings.) All of the mean ratings are below 3.0, indicating that
13 Following the comparison of the FSA and FeAS results, some suggestions for ways
the professional societies can improve the helpfulness of professional factors are given.
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4
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4
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6
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3
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5

4
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6

4
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7

8
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7
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the factors generally are not viewed as presenting particularly significant challenges to large percentages of the respondents. Nearly
all of the challenges, however, receive a rating of 5.0 (presents a
very significant challenge) by at least some of the respondents, and
most are rated 3.0, 4.0, or 5.0 by at least 25 percent of respondents.
This suggests that these challenges, while not viewed as widespread
problems, are sufficiently pervasive that they should not be ignored
by management. Managers and supervisors need to be alert to identify
and handle (on an individual basis) those situations where reasonably significant challenges are encountered by members of their staffs
in attempting to respond appropriately to ethical dilemmas at work.
The five challenges ranked as the most problematic in the
respondents' personal efforts to act ethically are (from most to least):
a) Intense competition in the insurance industry that forces owners,
managers, and others to focus on the bottom line and not on business ethics.
b) Competition encountered in business activities.
c) Conflict between duty to the employer or clients and duty to regulators or the public.
d) Conflict between duty to the employer and duty to the clients.
e) Pressure from others compensated by commissions.
The two challenges rated the highest deal primarily with competitive pressures. The importance of these pressures as a challenge
to behaving ethically is found in previous studies of insurance professionals (e.g., Cooper and Frank 1991a, 1992a). While economic theory
suggests that competition is good for business and its owners, perhaps
its impact from an ethical standpoint is not always favorable, especially when the rights and obligations of other stakeholders (such as
customers, employees, and the general public) are taken into consideration.
That actuaries may have difficulties ascertaining and balancing
the rights and obligations of the various stakeholders is seen in the
third and fourth highest-rated challenges. Both deal with conflict
between duty to one's employer and duty to other stakeholders
(public/regulators and clients). The third highest rated challenge
(involving conflict between duty to employer and public/regulators) is
related closely to Issues 8 and 9 on the issues survey, which also
receive high ratings.
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3.6 Comparison with FSA Study Findings: Challenges
The factors cited by FCAS respondents as presenting the greatest
challenges to their personal efforts to act ethically are similar to
those cited by the FSAs in the Cooper and Frank (1992a) study.
Three of the top five FCAS challenges (C1, CS, and C6) are also in
the top five FSA challenges. One of the remaining two (C4) is not
included in the FSA survey, and one (CIS) is ranked sixth by the
FSAs. Both groups of actuaries rate Challenge 6 (intense competition
forcing a focus on the bottom line) as the most troublesome. As in the
helps case, the correlation between the FCAS and FSA groups is
high, 0.9819.

4 Summary and Conclusions
The ethics literature recognizes that professionals working in a
business environment may look to a variety of factors to assist them
in resolving ethical dilemmas and that the relative importance
placed on these factors may vary across professional groups. Raelin
(1989) distinguishes the "cosmopolitan" professional, who "pledges
loyalty to the profession" and the "local" professional who extends
loyalty to the business organization. A cosmopolitan professional
should tend to value professional resources higher than those related
to the business environment when resolving ethical dilemmas.
The results of this study indicate that actuaries tend to look first
to their own personal values, next to certain factors in their business
environment, and only then to professional factors. That is, actuaries
tend to be more local than cosmopolitan in their search for solutions
to ethical problems. This is not to say that professional factors are
unimportant; rather, they tend to be viewed as less helpful than
business factors. These results are consistent with prior studies of both
insurance and accounting professionals. 14
These findings suggest that one way the professional actuarial
societies could assist their members is to improve the helpfulness of
the professional factors (e.g., the codes of professional conduct, published materials on ethics, professional meetings as a place to discuss
ethical issues, and the recently established ABCD). A recent paper
by Feldblum (1993) makes a similar suggestion. After examining the
ability of the AAA Code of Professional Conduct to distinguish ethical and unethical behaviors, Feldblum recommends that the Code be
14 The relative importance of business factors over professional factors has been found
in studies by Cooper and Frank (1991a and b) and Heaston, Cooper, and Frank (1993).

23

Vaughan, Cooper, and Frank

Ethical Issues

supplemented with guidelines, explanations and interpretations, and
case studies.1 5 Some actuaries fear, however, that too much specificity would reduce actuarial work to a cookie cutter approach to
solving problems. While there are legitimate differences of opinion
over what form (e.g., guidelines, case studies) supplemental materials should take and how rigid and enforceable they should be, it
seems clear that the professional societies can do more to improve
the helpfulness of professional factors.
The professional societies should recognize in developing a plan
for ethical guidance, however, that the business environment tends to
be among the first places actuaries look for help and that the boss is
among the first places they go within the business environment.
Because many actuaries are managers ("bosses"), they have both an
opportunity and a responsibility to influence the ethical environment
in which they work. The most effective efforts by the professional
societies to foster ethical behavior may be those efforts aimed at
enhancing their members' ability to contribute to an ethical business
environment.
There are two directions that could be taken by the professional
organizations to assist their members in influencing the business environment. The first is aimed at changing the internal business environment; that is, assisting members to contribute to a corporate culture
that encourages and rewards ethical behavior. This would involve,
for example, training manager-actuaries to identify and counsel subordinates facing ethical dilemmas. It could involve assisting manager-actuaries in their efforts to introduce ethical resources in their
own firms. For example, the professional societies could provide education on how to create an effective corporate code of ethics and how
to implement corporate programs providing assistance to employees in
resolving ethical dilemmas.
The second direction is aimed at influencing the external business
environment by addressing the issues that actuaries find most troublesome. For life actuaries, the number one issue is policy illustrations;
for casualty actuaries, it is pressure to change assumptions in pricing
and reserving. These issues are within the actuary's realm of expertise, but competitive pressures within the industry make it difficult
for one individual to act alone. For example, many companies apparently discount loss reserves implicitly on statutory financial state15 Feldblum concludes that the Code is merely a first step to the development of a
guide for ethical behavior. "To be universally applicable, the Code must be general: it
prohibits that which is clearly wrong, but it Ieaves the ambiguous untouched. In prac tice, ethical dilemmas come In shades of gray, for which noole precepts provide Insufficient guidance."
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ments, in spite of statutory prohibitions against discounting,16 To the
extent this is an industry-wide phenomenon and individual companies
are targeted for supervision by the degree to which their financial
results vary from the norm, it would be difficult for a single company
to behave differently. Professional associations could influence this
situation by aggressively pursuing realistic statutory accounting standards. On the life side, the associations could pursue clearly defined
guidelines for policy illustrations,17
Both life and casualty actuaries also give high rankings to issues
focusing on relations with consumers and providing quality products
and services that meet consumer needs. These issues rest on the heart
of the major problem facing the industry-the public's lack of trust
and the need to rebuild that trust. This is a problem not easily
addressed, but one that has received significant attention in recent
years. Actuaries should play a major role in rebuilding that trust,
both individually (by encouraging an emphasis on ethical and sound
business practices) and as a group (by developing industry-wide
responses to the problem).
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Managing the Relative Volumes of Participating and
Nonparticipating Business in a Mutual Life Company
Robert G. Chadburn*

Abstract**
Management decisions of a mutual life company involving the amounts and relative proportions of participating (with profits) and nonparticipating (without profits)
business and the level of expenses are examined in relation to their effect on participating policyholders' returns. A particular expense ratio is defined that plays a key
role in a framework for making such decisions. The sensitivity of participating policy
returns to changes in each factor are analyzed. Companies with expense ratios (as
defined) of less than 2 are shown to prefer a different strategy from companies with
higher ratios. There is an incomplete tendency for the ratio to stabilize either at unity
or to tend to infinity. The practical implications and limitations of the approach are
considered.
Key words: decision making; expenses; new business

1 Introduction
This paper concerns certain management decisions relating to
mutual life companies (offices); the position regarding stock
(proprietary) companies is different and is only briefly discussed.
A United Kingdom (U.K.) environment is assumed, although the
circumstances are general enough to make the conclusions appropriate
to other countries, including the United States. Some of the comments
made and procedures adopted in the paper, however, reflect peculiarities of the U.K. (including methods of dividend distribution,
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product design, and statutory regulation). Brief descriptions of these
features will be given to assist non-U.K. readers.
In the U.K., participating (with profits) policyholders' dividends are paid in two forms, referred to as reversionary and terminal
bonuses. Reversionary bonuses are additions to the contractual policy
benefit; they usually are made annually, at the discretion of the
company's actuary, to reflect a proportion of the surplus earned during the previous year. Terminal bonuses are added at the claim date
of the policy, again at the discretion of the actuary, so that the
total policy benefit on maturity of a policy will be equal to the policy's asset share plus an element of smoothing. In a mutual company
the return to the participating policyholder also will include a share
in the company's profits or losses from other sources, such as those
generated by nonparticipating business, plus any contribution made to
or from the estate.
The nature of the statutory regulations regarding the valuation of
assets and liabilities combined with the particular features of the
participating business described above result in different patterns of
emergence of statutory surplus. Nonparticipating (without profit)
business generally produces large initial surplus strains, followed by
small regular profits emerging in subsequent years. The large strains,
however, can be reduced by modern product designs. Participating
business, for which reserves only are required for the contractual benefit plus declared bonuses, lead to reduced or even nonzero initial
strains, followed by relatively large contributions to statutory surplus
for a considerable period of the policy's duration. A large strain then
is produced at the claim date when the terminal bonus becomes
payable. As a result, the issue of new participating business will tend
to improve the statutory surplus position, while the issue of nonparticipating business will tend to have the opposite effect. This is a
factor that will bear on later discussion.
In the U.K., traditional nonparticipating business such as term
and whole life insurances do not constitute much of a mutual company's portfolio. A considerable and possibly increasing volume of
business consists of unit-linked contracts.1 Later in the paper situations are hypothesized in which 35 percent or more of a mutual company's portfolio consists of nonparticipating business. While such a
proportion may have been unlikely historically, more recently this
would not be an incredible figure for some firms.
1 In a unit-linked insurance contract, premiums (after deductions for expense and claim
charges) are allocated to units, the value of which directly reflect the returns
obtained from a specific pool of assets. The charges represent the nonparticipating
premium to the company for these contracts
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The decisions considered in this paper are those that ultimately
have an effect upon the volumes of new participating and nonparticipating business issued by a mutual company and in the management of
expense levels.
According to a basic principle of economics, the more units of
product that are sold at the same price for a fixed level of expense,
the greater will be the profit per unit sold. Furthermore, an increase
in expense levels if accompanied by a greater proportionate increase
in units sold will increase unit-profit. This is referred to as economies

of scale.
In the life insurance business, units of product (policies) are sold,
at least partly, with the aim of making a profit and with the
knowledge that the activities of selling and managing the business
involve expenses that offset profit. A stock company issuing nonparticipating policies will conform ultimately to the basic economic
principles stated above, as will a nonparticipating portfolio within a
mutual company.
A mutual company, which must have a significant portfolio of
participating policyholders on its books, is in an unusual position. As
a mutual, all profits earned by both the participating and nonparticipating portfolios must be distributed (ultimately) to the participating policyholders. This means that while increasing the number of
participating units sold for a given level of expense will reduce the
average cost for each unit sold (thereby increasing unit profit), it also
will reduce each unit's share of the profits earned by the nonparticipating portfolio (thereby decreasing unit profit). The position of the
mutual company is therefore more complex than the position of a
nonparticipating stock company case. The overall profitability of a
mutual company depends on the relative levels of profit from the
nonparticipating portfolio compared with the level of expenses. It is
this position that will be explored in section 3 of this paper.
Profit is not the only consideration of importance to management
when arriving at decisions that may affect business volume. For
example, the mutual company at all times must maintain a sufficient
statutory surplus both to satisfy the regulators and to make investments that are in the best long-term interests of the policyholders,
including investment in the issue of new nonparticipating contracts.
This surplus is provided by the existence of a participating portfolio,
as well as from profits retained from earlier generations of policyholders. A certain relative level of participating business is necessary; without it, a mutual company could not exist.
There are also factors at work in the market that may affect
business volume irrespective of any other ambitions the management
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may have. For example, sales of nonparticipating contracts may be
affected by premium rate, while sales of participating policies may
be influenced by historical and current profitability. Customer preferences for products may change over time, and changes to tax legislation (e.g., removal of tax reliefs on insurance premiums) dramatically
can influence sales volume. These factors must be borne in mind when
considering the implications of the results described in this paper.
The present analysis will need to distinguish between two types
of expenses: proportionate and nonproportionate expenses: 2
a) Proportionate expenses are variable expenses associated with participating and nonparticipating portfolios, and these expenses are
proportionate to the volumes of business sold.
b) Nonproportionate expenses are the remaining expenses, consisting of
other variable expenses and fixed expenses. Nonproportionate
expenses can be considered as expenses that colfechvely vary
with the decision made, but not necessarily in proportion to any
change in volume of business resulting from the decision.
For example, a particular management decision may lead to an
increase in nonproportionate expenses of X percent, coupled with an
increase in nonparticipating sales of Y percent; X and Yare not linked
to each other in any way other than that they are both dependent
upon the decision made. A mutual company attempting to expand its
operations to produce economies of scale may be faced with such a
decision set. As will be seen in section 3 below, it is always best to
choose the decision that produces the greatest increase in sales for
the smallest increase in nonproportionate expenses, everything else
being equal.

2 Construction of Total Profit
All references to present values refer to a time ongm (time 0)
unless otherwise stated. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that the discount rate used to calculate present values is equal to the
rate of investment return earned over the lifetime of the portfolio.
Further, without loss of generality, it is assumed that the mutual
2 Chalke (1991) considers expenses at any decision point to be "nonmarginal" if they
are invariable by any of the possible decisions made. Expenses that vary according to
the decision made are described as "marginal expenses." Ramsay (1991), in his comment on Chalke's paper, points out that these expenses more appropriately are
described as "fixed' and "variable" respectively, in accordance with more traditional
parlance. Chalke notes that fixed expenses at one decision point may become the
variable expenses of the next decision point.
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company's business consists of one tranche 3 of nonparticipating business and one tranche of participating business, all issued at time 0. 4
The policies within each tranche are assumed to be identical. The
company is assumed to incur three distinct types of expenses:
a) Proportionate expenses of the nonparticipating business;
b) Proportionate expenses of the participating business;
c) Nonproportionate expenses.
The management also has ultimate control of business volume, separately for each tranche.
Three types of profit, Pn , Plo ' and P~, need to be defined.

Pn

Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of proportionate expenses) earned by a single nonparticipating polICY issued at time 0;
Plo
Actuarial present value of future marginal profits (net of proportionate expenses) earned by a single participating policy
Issued at time 0; and
P~ = Actuarial present value of the marginal profits earned by a
single participating policy including the value of the benefit
payments.
=

Appendix 1 contains a detailed description of the method used to calculate Pn and Pw .
While in reality individual policies, even of the same size and
type, earn different profits (e.g., due to different dates of claim), it is
assumed that each policy earns the same average (or expected)
profit. The effect of changes in business volume on profit variability
is not considered in this paper.
It is assumed that marginal profits are fixed and independent of
sales volume. In practice this is not entirely true: cheaper products
are easier to sell, but will have lower marginal profit. In the present
context it is helpful to think of the nonparticipating business as a
body of unit-linked policies with premium rates that are effectively
the charges deducted from the policy benefits. In these cases, policy
sales depend more on expected investment returns obtained from the
policyholder's unit-holding than upon the rates of charge levied to
3 Here

tranche refers to business issued within a specific and limited time period.

Similar conclusions could be drawn assuming the company is in a stationary position,
in real terms, issuing constant volumes of new business each year. A single tranche
model, however, is much easier to visualize.

4
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cover expenses and other costs, at least up to a point. Hence, an
assumption of invariant marginal profit per policy can be justified for
the purpose of illustrating the point of interest in this paper. The
effect of introducing a price/volume relationship for the nonparticipating business in the model is an aspect worthy of further investigation.
Let
Nn
Nw

= Number of nonparticipating policies issued at time 0;

Number of participating policies issued at time 0;
Actuarial present value of all future nonproportionate
expenses (with respect to these two tranches of business).

E(n)

The present value of the company's future retained profits from the
two tranches, TP, then is given by:

Because, over the lifetime of the business, all the profits earned by
the two tranches are paid to the participating policyholders in policy benefits,S it follows that TP = O.
Let c be the present value of future benefits paid to a single participating policy (assumed to be the same for all participating policies), then P~ is given by
P~ =

Pw + c.

P~ can be considered as the value of future premiums, less
proportionate expenses, plus the policy's returns on investment.
Hence:

or
c

= P~ +

(1)

This may not always be the case. Smoothing participating policy returns may result
in more or less than asset shares being paid, while there may be a strategy to expand
or contract the estate for good management reasons. Because policy benefits are
designed to follow asset shares and the estate is ultimately a policyholder asset, then
it seems appropriate to assume that, on average, TP = O.

5
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In other words, the present value of the benefits under a single par-

ticipating policy is equal to the value of its premiums, including
investment income and net of proportionate expenses, plus that policy's share of the profits from the tranche of nonparticipating policies, less that policy's share of the nonproportionate expenses of the
company.
From equation (1) it easily can be seen that increasing the volume
of nonparticipating business N n , or reducing the amount of nonproportionate expenses E(n), will increase the return to the individual participating policyholder c. Increasing the volume of participating
business only will increase returns, however, if (N I1 PI1 - E(l1)) is negative. That is, the ratio E(l1) I(N n Pn) is greater than unity. This ratio
will be referred as R, or as the expense ratio,
E(I1)

R= N n Pn

and it represents the extent to which the non proportionate expenses
of the portfolio are covered by the nonparticipating business.
The rest of this paper is concerned with identifying the relative
effects of varying N n , NWI and E(I1) on participating policy returns for
different values of R. In addition, the paper establishes a framework
for the construction of management decisions for companies with particular expense ratios subject to different business prospects.

3 Controlling the Variables to Maintain or Improve
Per Policy Profit
3.1 The Variables
It will be assumed that at time 0 management can make decisions
that affect N n' N w , E(n), or any combination of these quantities.
Equation (2) below represents the value of the participating per policy returns (subsequently referred to as per policy returns) after changes
in each of these variables,

(2)

-1 ::; a~n), lXn <

00

and a w > -1,

where an' a w , a~n), and a c are parameters indicating the proportional
changes in the number of nonparticipating policies, number of
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participating policies, nonparticipating expenses, and per policy
returns respectively.

3.2 Maintaining Returns
Whenever conditions change, it is reasonable to assume that the
aim of management will be to ensure that per policy returns do not
fall, (i.e., to ensure that a c is never negative). Subtracting equation
(1) from equation (2) yields:

which implies:
(3)

It is instructive to examine the behavior of a c with respect to the
other parameters. From equation (3),

(4)
because the constants c and N w are positive and N n and Pn are nonnegative. Notice that the right side of equation (4) is independent of
an, a~n), and R. Thus, returns increase at a constant rate for any
change in these quantities.
Similarly,
(5)

and
(6)
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From equation (5), returns (as a function of a w ) either are decreasing,
zero, or increasing if R < 1, R = 1, or R > 1, respectively. Finally, from
equation (6) we see that for a given a w , returns decrease at a constant
rate regardless of the level of a~n).
Let us now investigate the behavior of a/u a w , and a~n) when
there is no change in the level of returns; that is, when a c = O. First,
setting a c = 0 in equation (3) yields :
(7)

That is, to maintain returns, the proportional change in the number of
nonparticipating policies (an) must be a weighted average of the
proportional change in the number of participating policies (a w ) and
the change in nonproportional expenses (aJ n ). Here the weights can
be negative (if R > 1). When 0 < R < 1, in order for returns to be
maintained, nonparticipating business has to be increased in response
to increases in both expenses and participating business. Decreases in
E(n) and N w would allow nonparticipating volume to fall while
maintaining returns.
Consider the following pairs of parameters: (a/ua w), (an' a~n),
and (aw,a~n) in equation (7), subject to the third parameter being set
equal to zero. Define fx/y as:

fx/y

=

ax
a
y

(8)

where (ax,a y ) is one of the pairs of parameters listed above and subject to the constraints of equation (7). In other words, ax is the change
in the factor identified by x which is exactly sufficient to maintain
returns (i.e., a c = 0) following a change of a y in the factor identified
by y and no change in the third factor in equation (7).

Definition 1
When / f / < 1, the response is termed efficient; when / f /
response is termed inefficient.

;?

1, the

Definition 2
If Ifx/z / < / fy/z I, then a change in z is compensated for more efficiently
(or less inefficiently) by changing x rather than y.
Consider the pair (an,aw). By setting a~n) = 0 in equation (7), we
have an = (l-R)aw which implies that:
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an
w

-a =In/w = (1-R)

(9)

Similarly, setting a w = 0 gives an = Ra~n) and

an

a~n) = In/e = R

while setting an

a ,V

a~n)

(10)

= 0 gives (1-R)a w + Ra~n) = 0 and
R

=Jw/e = R -

(11)

1.

The following results are derived easily from Definition 1:
Efficient Region
In/w
In/e

= (l-R)
=R
R

Inefficient Region

0<R<2

R

~

2

0< R < 1

R

~

1

R

0< R < 1/2

Jw/e = R-l

~

1/2.

Tables 1 through 3 display summary information on the effects of controlling various parameters to maintain per policy returns.
TABLE 1
Summary of the Nonparticipating Business Response With Respect to Changes in
Expenses and Volume of Participating Business in Order to Maintain per Policy Returns

R
(0,1/2)
(1/2, 1)
(1,2)

(2,00)

Nonparticipating
Response
INC
INC
INC
INC

Due to
Nonparticipating:

E

INC
INC
DEC
DEC

E
E
I

INC = Increase
DEC =Decrease
E = Efficient
I = Inefficient
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Due to
Expenses:
INC
INC
INC
INC

E

E
I
I

Notes

'nlw> 'nle
'nle> 'n/w
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TABLE 2
Summary of the Participating Business Response
With Respect to Changes in Expenses
and Volume of Nonparticipating Business
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns
Participating
Response

R

Due to
Nonparticipating:
DEC
DEC
DEC
DEC

DEC
DEC
INC
INC

(0,1/2)
(1/2, 1)
(1,2)
(2,00)

I
I
I
E

Due to
Expenses:
INC
INC
INC
INC

E
I
I
I

Notes
No solution where
R(1+ ae) > (1+ an)

For key, see bottom of Table 1

TABLE 3
Summary of the Expenses Response With Respect to
Changes in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and Participating Business
in Order to Maintain Per Policy Returns
Expenses
Response

R
(0,1/2)
(1/2,1)
~1, 2)
2,00)

Due to
Participating:

DEC
DEC
DEC
DEC

INC
INC
DEC
DEC

I
E
E
E

Due to
Nonparticipating:
DEC
DEC
DEC
DEC

I
I
E
E

Notes
No solution where
an < aw- R(1+ aw)

For key, see bottom of Table 1

4 Sensitivity Analysis
The extent to which changes in the three factors affect the per
policy returns now will be analyzed using a hypothetical model company.
The model company is composed entirely of 10 year annual premium pure endowments, with one tranche in unit-linked
(nonparticipating) form, the other as participating. The methodology
used to calculate P n , P~, and E(n) are described fully in Appendix 1.
The assumptions used to calculate Pn and Pz~ are given in Appendix 2.
These assumptions lead to Pn = £255.69; P~ = £3517.45
The present value of future nonproportionate expenses E(n) is calculated such that Pn less one policy's share of these expenses is equal
to 50 percent of the initial commission (IC), i.e.,
E(n)

0.5 x Ie

= Pn -

N +N
n

w

.

This implies that:
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= (N n + N w ) (P n -

0.5 x Ie)

(according to these assumptions).
The present value of the participating maturity benefit c is calculated according to equation (1). The participating policy is assumed
to have a sum assured S such that a compound reversionary bonus of 5
percent per annum (with no terminal bonus) will lead to the implied
maturity value of c x (1.1)10, i.e.,
1.1
S = c x ( 1.05

)10.

The analysis involves calculating c(l +(Xc) using equation (2), produced for values of (Xc of +0.5 and -0.5, for each of the three factors in
turn for R = 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0. Note that (Xc can be expressed
in terms of the implied revised reversionary bonus rate (r), which
satisfies:

The results are given in Table 4, and the changed values of R which
correspond to these revised bonus rates are given in Table 5.
TABLE 4
Implied Reversionary Bonus Yields Percent for 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses
and in the Volumes of Nonparticipating and PartiCipating Business According to the
Model Described in Section 4 and Appendix 1
N w = 1000 throughout (A value of 5 percent indicates no change in yield)
R

0.50
0.75
1.00
1.50
2.00
3.00

Nn
4771.00
1228.00
704.62
380.40
260.50
159.80

0.5

an =

6.46
5.45
5.27
5.15
5.10
5.06

aw=

-0.5

0.5

3.33
4.53
4.73
4.85
4.90
4.94

4.47
4.92
5.00
5.05
5.07
5.08
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af.en) --0.5

-0.5

0.5

6.46
5.23
5.00
4.85
4.60
4.75

4.20
4.65
4.73
4.78
4.80
4.81

5.75
5.34
5.27
5.22
5.20
5.19
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TABLES
Changes to the Expense Ratio RAfter 50 Percent Variations in Fixed Expenses and in
the Volumes
of Nonparticipating and Participating Business,
Where These Values Correspond to the Same Changed Situations That Produce the
Yields Shown in Table 4 at any Given Value of R
0.5

an=

0.67A

-D.S

0.5

2R

R

aw=

-0.5

R

1.SR

O.SR

5 Discussion
5.1 Interpretation of the Results
In this section reference will be made particularly to Tables 1 to 4
and to equations (9) to (11).
Consider first Table 4. Sensitivity to changes varies both according to the company' expense ratio, R, and according to the factor
involved. Returns become extremely sensitive at expense ratios below
0.5. But as these values imply high nonparticipating volumes coupled
with low expenses, ratios in this region are unlikely in mutual life
companies, which need a substantial volume of participating business
to be viable.
As a general observation, yield becomes less sensitive to changes
the higher is the expense ratio. At values of R above about 1.5 the
improvements in yield due to increasing the volume of either types of
business are barely appreciable. For these values of R, the greatest
improvements are achieved by reducing nonproportionate expense
levels.
At values of R above about 2, the most significant adverse effect
is due to a decrease in the volume of participating business; hence,
maintaining the volume of this business should be of most concern to a
company with such a ratio. From Definition 2, Ife/w I < Ifn/w I indicates that an unavoidable fall in participating volume is much more
efficiently dealt with by decreasing expenses than by increasing nonparticipating volume. This difference in efficiency becomes more
marked for increasingly large values of R. Similarly, an increase in
expenses is compensated for more efficiently by increasing participating rather than nonparticipating volume ( Ifw!e I < 1;;1!e I ).
Offices with ratios between 1 and 2 should become more concerned
with falls in nonparticipating volume and increases in expense levels.
Reducing expense levels is a much more efficient way of compensating
for a fall in nonparticipating volume than increasing participating
volume ( Ife/n I < Ifw/n I ). At ratios close to unity, varying the partic-
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ipating volume will have almost no effect on yield. There is no efficient way to deal with increasing expenses at these ratios; hence,
this would appear to be the most significant problem. If increasing
expenses is unavoidable, then increasing the nonparticipating volume
is the least inefficient way of compensating ( Ifn/e I < I fw/e I). The
greatest improvements at these ratios can be achieved by increasing
nonparticipating volume or by decreasing the nonproportionate
expenses.
At ratios below unity a rather peculiar and apparently unstable
situation exists, as per policy returns increase with a fall in participating volume, reflecting the increased share of the (positive) value
of (N n Pn - E(n») per participating policy. Returns become increasingly
sensitive to changes in all factors, but particularly to changes in the
nonparticipating volume. There is no efficient way of compensating
for a fall in nonparticipating volume at these levels-it is of particular concern to management to maintain nonparticipating volume here.
Between ratios of 0.5 and I, Ife/n I < I fw/n I , i.e., it is less inefficient
to compensate for falling nonparticipating business by reducing
expenses than by decreasing participating sales; however, the opposite is the case for the (rather unlikely) situation where the expense
ratio is below 0.5.
At ratios below unity, Ifn/e I < I, so that an increase in expenses
can be compensated for efficiently by increasing nonparticipating volume. Reducing the participating business is also an efficient way of
dealing with increased expenses at ratios below 0.5, although the
nonparticipating route is always the most efficient method.

5.2 Consequences of Management Decisions
A company with an expense ratio exceeding 2 would be most concerned with maintaining and increasing participating sales and controlling expenses. Economies of scale are easier to achieve using participating sales the larger the value of the expense ratio. But in all
cases, a greater proportionate increase in sales than in expenses is
needed to secure these economies. These actions would tend to increase
the expense ratio, making it proportionately easier to achieve further economies of scale. The high ratio position persists and tends to
become increasingly stable as R ~ 00.
At expense ratios in the region 1 < R < 2, it becomes increasingly
easier (in proportionate terms) to maintain or to improve returns by
increasing nonparticipating business or by reducing expenses.
Economies of scale best would be achieved by increasing nonparticipating sales, although the proportionate increase in sales has to be
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larger than that of the expenses. All these actions would result in
yet lower expense ratios, making economies of scale easier to achieve
and hence continuing the reduction in expense ratio to unity. Any
attempt to obtain economies of scale by increasing the participating
portfolio becomes increasingly difficult and inefficient, the closer the
expense ratio is to 1 from 2. If successful, though, such an action
would tend to increase the ratio.
At expense ratios below unity, economies of scale can be achieved
efficiently by increasing the nonparticipating business (i.e., if the
result of the decision is for 1 > an > In/e X ak n ). This action (i.e.,
efficiently producing economies of scale) would tend to increase the
expense ratio toward unity. Even greater returns could be achieved if
an > I, in which case the ratio will reduce. Participating sales,
however, cannot be increased without lowering per policy profit (or
at least without increasing the nonparticipating portfolio sufficiently
to compensate for the losses). On the other hand, a company in such a
position may be providing higher returns than its market
competitors, other things being equal. Such returns would make the
company attractive to new participating policyholders, who would
accept a fall in per policy profit just to obtain a share of some of it;
alternatively, the company could be a potential candidate for
demutualization. Hence, market forces could act to increase the
participating portfolio-if this ultimately leads to increases in nonproportionate expenses, then this also will increase the expense
ratio. Another alternative is for the company to reduce its nonparticipating premium rates (or charges), which would tend to increase the
expense ratio as P n would be reduced. This effectively transfers some
of the superprofits to the nonparticipating policyholders, an action
that might be required on the grounds of equity. The need to maintain
the participating portfolio in order to provide an adequate statutory
surplus also should be borne in mind.
If the only consideration of management is to increase per policy
returns, then once R < 1 the optimum decision would be to reduce the
participating portfolio down to one policy. Market forces, coupled
with the company's need to provide capital, would tend to reverse
the trend. The ultimate position (Le., value of R) at which a company would tend to maintain itself would be largely dependent upon
the market level of per policy profits expected from participating
policies, although there is a partially stable point at R = 1 caused
by attempts to produce economies of scale through efficient increases
to the nonparticipating portfolio.
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There are two distinct strategies that a company can adopt to
maintain a required level of profit, associated respectively with low
and high expense ratios.
a) Low Ratio Strategy-A company with an expense ratio in the
region of unity would be in a highly manageable position. With
all nonproportionate expenses covered by nonparticipating business, participating volume can be increased or decreased with no
change to returns, provided the statutory solvency position is not
compromised by any decrease in volume. Control of per policy
profit would rest entirely with controlling the volume of nonparticipating business and level of nonproportionate expenses (and in
controlling the expense ratio). Market demand for profit levels
would tend to dIctate where the ratio ultimately would lie,
although pursuit of economies of scale introduces a partial optimum expense ratio at unity itself.
b) High Ratio Strategy-A company with a high expense ratio
implies that nonparticipating business is essentially an insignificant proportion of the portfolio. Control of per policy profit
would rest almost entirely with controlling the volume of participating business and the level of nonproportionate expenses,
while pursuit of economies of scale would tend to increase the
expense ratio still further.

5.3

Practical Implications

The main implications from the above are for mutual life companies that maintain significant volumes of nonparticipating (including
unit-linked) business, implying low expense ratios and hence requiring
a low ratio strategy. The lower the ratio, the more sensitive per policy profits are to changes in the constituents of the expense ratio. At
ratios less than unity, the fact that increasing participating business
reduces profit should be borne in mind. At ratios near unity, management should bear in mind that no increase (or decrease) in the participating portfolio will affect returns; a policy of expansion involving
increasing expenses matched by increasing the sales of participating
contracts would have only adverse effects on returns. Such companies
also need to consider the need to meet statutory solvency levels,
always an important consideration where significant levels of nonparticipating business are involved.
The actual value of the ratio for any particular company will
determine the required response to adopt for any particular situation:
for example, when pursuing economies of scale, in determining the
minimum increase required to the nonparticipating portfolio to cover
an increase in expense levels. Other management decisions that can
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be assisted by the response relationships described in this paper
include:
a) How can market share be increased most efficiently in order to
make minimum losses/maximum profits for the participating policyholders?
b) When business is falling, to what extent should expenses be
reduced and which type of business is it most important to retain?

6 Summary
The ratio of nonproportionate expenses to total marginal profits
from nonparticipating business (the expense ratio) is a key factor in
determining management policy regarding business volume and
expenses.
Relationships presented in this paper can be used to determine
minimum responses required to compensate for changes in any of the
factors in order to maintain per policy returns and also to assist management in choosing appropriate strategies for achieving such aims
as economies of scale, increasing market share, or cost-cutting.
Decision choices should vary depending on whether the company
has a low expense ratio (less than 2) or a high expense ratio (greater
than 2). There are two partially optimum ratios, at R = 1 and R ~ 00,
both resulting from companies choosing the most efficient methods to
produce economies of scale at R < 2 and R > 2, respectively.
It is not sufficient to assume that increasing sales of participating
contracts will improve per policy returns, as the greater coverage of
expenses is offset to a greater or lesser extent by the dilution of profits from the nonparticipating portfolio.
Particularly at low expense ratios, decision choices identified by
the relationships described in this paper will be constrained by the
need to meet statutory solvency levels and to maintain adequate
investment flexibility. Other factors, such as market forces, also can
affect levels of business. All relevant factors should be considered
together.
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Appendix 1
Let
Wqx
nqx

=

wPx
npx

=

Probability of a participating policyholder at age x dying
before age x + 1;
Probability of a nonparticipating policyholder at age x
dying before age x + 1;
1- Wqx;

1- nqx'

Assume that all participating policies are t year pure endowments
issued to a life age x. If a participating policyholder dies before the
policy matures at age x + t, there is a return of the accumulated fund
at the end of the year of death. The fund is set equal to the participating policy's asset share on death (including its share of nonparticipating policy profits and its share of nonproportionate expenses).
Premiums are level and are paid for t years.
Define Fk to be the expected fund at time k immediately before
the payment of the death benefit:
(A.l)
where wFk, n Fb and eFk are defined below.
(A.2)

nh = N n

k-l

L

r=O

W
n
( )
k-l-r PX+r X rPx X (Hr - n EjP )(1

+

i)k-r

(A.3)

(A.4)

where:
(1 +i)-1;
=

=

=

Annual gross premium;
Per policy proportionate expenses for a single
participating policy paid at time r;
Per policy proportionate expenses for a single nonparticipating policy paid at time r;
Charges paid at time r per nonparticipating policy; and
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Total nonproportional expenses at time r.

Note that the payment (n H r - n EfI}) at time r depends on the
survival of nonparticipating policyholders to time r. What remains
of these payments by time k - 1 depends on how many participating
policyholders survive to time k - 1. Clearly wFb n Fb and eFk are
actuarial "accumulated" values up to time k - 1 (including both
interest and mortality) and from time k - 1 to time k using interest
only.
The expected actuarial present value of future claims per participant policy is c where
t-1

t:o vk+1
c

x

v

WqX+k X Fk+1 + t

=

x

wpx +t_1 X F t

(A.S)

Nw

Next, define P~, P n , and E(n} as follows:

P~

+ ~Px

r

t-1

t-1

= )'

bO

(G - wE)p})

r=O

vr

rr=O k-rPx+r x nrPx
k W

WqX+k

(A.6)

X (H r - n E)p}) v r

(A.7)

and
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From the definition of c in equation (A.S),

+V

t
X

W
[WFt N n
Px+t-l N w + N w

X

n Ft _ eFt]
Nn Nw

(A.9)
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Appendix 2-Model Office Assumptions
Annual premium

=£600

Proportionate Expenses
Initial commission
Renewal commission
Other initial expenses
Investment expenses

Other renewal expenses

= 50 percent of annual

premium
2.5 percent of annual
premium
= £60
= 0.25 percent of accumulated asset share
at end of each year
= £6 per annum, inflating at 7.5 percent per
annum

Charges for Unit-Linked Policy
Initial
Renewal for commission
Renewal for fund management charge

Renewal for other

Other Assumptions
Asset accumulation rate
Rates of mortality and withdrawal
Tax rates
Discount rate for calculating present values

£500
2.5 percent of annual
premium
0.5 percent of unit
fund at end of each
year
= £15 inflating at 7.5
percent per annum

=

= 10 percent per annum

=
=

nil
nil
= 10 percent per annum

KG. Chadburn
Department of Actuarial Science & Statistics
The City University
Northampton Square
London ECl V OHB
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A Critique of Defined Contribution Plans Using a
Simulation Approach
David M. Knox*

Abstract**
During the 1980s there was a trend in many countries away from defined benefit
plans toward defined contribution plans. This development means that the individual
member bears the full investment risk in the preretirement period and the annuity rate
risk at retirement, as no pension benefit (expressed as a percentage of salary) is provided.
This paper, through the use of a stochastic model for both inflation and a range
of investment returns, analyses the distribution of retirement incomes that will be produced from a defined contribution plan. The impacts of changing entry and exit ages,
different investment strategies, alternative career paths, and different economic
assumptions also are assessed. The uncertainty of the resulting income benefits is highlighted, and the question is raised as to whether the individual member is aware of
these results.
Key words: funding, pensions, risk

1 Introduction
The provision of retirement income for employees traditionally
has been initiated by employers through a defined benefit scheme
providing pension benefits. During the last decade, however, there
has been a significant shift in many countries toward the provision of
retirement benefits through defined contribution plans (or money purchase arrangements). The reasons for this trend vary between countries, but include:

* David Knox is the Foundation Professor at the University of Melbourne and director
of the Centre for Actuarial Studies. He previously has taught at Macquarie University
and at the University of Waterloo. His recent research interests have concentrated on
some of the broader taxation and social policy issues in the superannuation and pensions area.
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great job, especially as the number of variables continued to grow! In addition, my
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a) The desire by some employers to reduce their risk present within
a defined benefit scheme.
b) Increasing legislation, which often has made defined benefit
plans more complex and costly to administer.
c) The presence of surplus in many defined benefit plans and the
related issues of overfunding, which may have been encouraged
by conservative actuarial assumptions.
d) The high rates of return in the 1980s which made defined contribution plans more attractive to members.
e) The trend toward individual responsibility and the desire by
many governments for employees to accept greater responsibility
in providing their retirement benefits (for example, with reductions in social security benefits in many countries).
f) The increasing levels of vesting and preservation required by
many governments often have been expressed in terms of members'
accumulated contributions.
g) Changing taxation structures that permitted and encouraged
defined contribution arrangements.
The extent of this trend varies between countries, but it is present in
sufficient countries to suggest a significant and long-term direction.
For example, within the United States the number of defined
benefit plans decreased 16.7 percent in the five years to 1988 while
the number of defined contribution plans increased 36.5 percent
(Turner and Beller, 1992). In the same period, the level of contributions to defined benefit private pension plans decreased 43.2 percent
to $26.3 billion in 1988 while the level of contributions to defined
contribution plans increased 79.7 percent to $64.9 billion in 1988.
Turner and Beller (1992, p. 9) note "the gradual but steady replacement of defined benefit plans by defined contribution plans as the
primary vehicle for providing pension benefits." In many, but not all,
of these cases the defined contribution benefit represents a benefit in
addition to a pension from a defined benefit scheme.
Within the United Kingdom, the trend toward defined contributions plans has not been as strong. The introduction of personal
portable pensions in 1988 with the associated legislation, however,
has meant that many individuals have been encouraged to contribute
to a money purchase (or defined contribution) arrangement.
The recent Australian experience also reflects the move toward
defined contribution plans. In 1987 a national industrial agreement
was handed down that granted most workers an employer contribution equal to 3 percent of earnings. In July 1992 this approach was
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extended so that all employees now receive a minimum employer contribution of either 3 percent or 5 percent of earnings (depending on the
size of the company). This minimum employer contribution will
increase to 9 percent of earnings by 2002. Although defined benefit
plans are permitted and remain with many larger employers, the
legislation expresses the minimum contributions in terms of current
earnings which represents a defined contribution approach.
This trend toward an increased reliance on defined contribution
funds to provide employees' retirement benefits needs to be assessed
in terms of the ultimate benefit provided to the member. Actuaries
are aware that within a defined benefit pension scheme, the
employer bears the investment risk, the salary inflation risk, and
the longevity risk (if an annuity is not purchased by the fund).
Within a defined contribution plan (where the employer contribution
is set as a fixed percentage of the employee's earnings and the final
benefit represents the accumulation of these contributions), however,
the employer bears none of these risks. Indeed, all risks have been
passed to the employee. If employees increasingly are bearing these
risks, it is essential that policy makers, individual members, and the
pension industry fully understand these risks. With this objective in
mind, this research analyses the defined contribution arrangements
from the member's perspective.
The paper will consider the benefits that arise from a contribution rate (fixed as a percentage of salary) allowing for stochastic
investment and inflation rates and changes in a number of parameters, including contrasting investment strategies, different entry and
retirement ages, fractional and full-time employment patterns, and
the impact of different annuity rates available at retirement. A
fixed 12 percent contribution rate has been chosen, as it provides an
adequate retirement pension, on average, for a person who is a member for about 40 years if there are no social security contributions and
benefits. For countries with compulsory social security, a lower level
of fixed contributions would be appropriate and the benefits can be
reduced proportionately. In Australia, where there exists no universal social security benefits, the government has a long-term objective
of a total contribution rate equal to 12 percent of earnings.

2 The Model

2. 1 Accumulation of Contributions and the Benefits Arising
During an individual's preretirement years, it is assumed that
contributions (expressed as a percentage of annual earnings) will be
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paid mid-way through each year and that investment income will be
generated until retirement age. Allowance also can made for any tax
payments on contributions and investment income. In many countries
(for example, the United States, Canada, and most European countries) contributions and investment income are tax exempt, so the relevant tax variables (T AXe and TAXI) can be set to zero without
affecting the model. A country where these rates are not zero is
Australia where both employer contributions and investment income
are taxed at a rate of 15 percent, although the investment tax rate
normally is reduced to a net rate between 5 percent and 10 percent due
to the availability of various credits.
Equation (1) represents the accumulated contributions available
at retirement age for the provision of retirement income. Let ACR be
an employee's accumulated contributions after R years in the plan;
then:
ACR = K (1-TAXe)

R-l

L, Ft SALt

t=O

(1 + INVt [1 -TAXI})1/2

(1)

x

R-l

IT (1+INVu [I-TAXI})
u=t+l

where:
K

TAXe
TAXI
Ft

=
=

SALt
INV t

=
=

R

Rate of contributions as a percentage of earnings;
Rate of tax on the contributions, paid at the time of payment;
Net rate of tax on investment earnings;
Fraction of full time employment in year t (to allow for
part timers);
Annual salary in year t;
Gross rate of investment return earned in year t;
Number of years in the plan before retirement.

For the purposes of this paper, it will be assumed that this accumulated amount will purchase an indexed annuity (or pension) payable
for life from the age of retirement. The value of the pension purchased can be expressed as follows:
ACR = PEN% x SALR-l x a(x)
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where:
PEN%

SALR-l
a(x)

Pension received as a percent of the individual's final
salary;
= Salary received in the final year prior to retirement;
Inflation-linked lifetime annuity factor for the retiree
age x (Le., at retirement).

Equations (1) and (2) must equal each other, as the accumulated
amount at retirement provides the funds required to purchase a pension at a rate related to the person's age and sex. In any individual
case, however, there are two parameters: namely K (the rate of contribution) and PEN% (the pension received in terms of final salary).
Within a defined contribution fund, K is defined and the pension can
be calculated based on the accumulated funds at retirement. In contrast, within a defined benefit pension fund, the pension percentage is
defined (normally ignoring any tax on the pension) so that a recommended rate of K can be calculated using actuarial principles.
The above equations do not make any allowances for taxes on benefits (which vary by country, individual income, and benefit form) or
expenses which may be in respect of initial expenses, regular administration or investment costs, or the costs associated with the purchase of an annuity. The important impact of expenses and the
varied form in which they are paid will be considered in a subsequent study.
The provision of retirement income from savings in the preretirement years requires funds to be accumulated over many years; several
long-term assumptions are therefore necessary. One approach is to use
a deterministic approach and set pre-determined levels of inflation
and investment return for each year. Such an approach, however,
does not allow analysis of the risk facing the individual member. To
provide greater reality in this model, simple stochastic models for
inflation and the investment return will be used.

2.2 Inflation and Salary Assumptions
The stochastic model used for inflation allows for a one year lag
as expressed in equation (3).
INFL t

= k x INFL t-l + (1-k) x

(/1 +

where:
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Standard normal variable for year t, i.e., Z - N(O,l);
Rate of inflation in year t;
A number between 0 and 1;
Mean of the normal distribution representing inflation;
Standard deviation of the normal distribution representing inflation.

The appropriate levels for k, /1, and (J2 can be debated. After some
empirical investigation into the inflation levels over the last 40
years in Australia, the following values provided a distribution of
inflation values that is similar to the previous 40 years' experience:
k
/1
(J

:=

0.5 (that is, 50 percent of last year's inflation is carried into
this year);
0.07;
0.07 (that is, the standard deviation).

The period of 40 years was chosen to cover the post-World War
period. In addition, beyond 40 years there is a problem with the
availability of reliable and consistent data.
Statistical tests show a significant effect for a one year lag, but
no significance for a longer lagged effect. The value of k also was
tested for all values between zero and one-a value of 0.5 provides a
slightly better result than other values in the range of 0.25 to 0.75
and much better results than values outside this range.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the history of inflation
does not necessarily indicate future levels. In particular, most OECD
(Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development) nations
have moved into a lower inflation environment. With this in mind,
the results will concentrate on /1 := 0.04 and (J := 0.04. The effects of
higher inflation rates, however, will be considered also.
As indicated above, the model requires an assumption in respect
to a person's salary in each of his or her preretirement years (that is,
the pattern of the person's salary from entry into the work force until
retirement age). This paper's approach is to consider that the annual
change in a person's salary comprises the following three components:
a) An increase related to inflation levels, which can be estimated
from the inflation equation outlined above.
b) An increase as a result of general productivity improvements
within the economy, which may be expressed as a percentage
rate per annum.
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A promotional increase that also will be expressed as a percentage rate per annum.

2.3 Investment Returns
The assumption of a single investment rate of return for a period
of 20, 30, or 40 years to estimate the accumulated value of a person's
retirement benefit is a bold and heroic assumption and is almost certain to be wrong! To provide greater understanding of the range of
possible results, each simulation assumes that each year's rate of
investment return is selected randomly from a distribution that represents the assumed experience, thereby allowing investment returns to
vary on a year to year basis.
It is assumed that the investment return is achieved by a fund
invested in a range of marketable assets with no promise of a guaranteed return. For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the
fund will invest in portfolios of bonds (both domestic and overseas),
equities (both domestic and overseas), direct property, and short-term
investments. That is, the fund will have a balanced investment
strategy spread over several sectors. Naturally, the actual proportions in each sector will vary with the investment strategy adopted.
It also will be assumed that the real rate of investment return in
year t is independent from the rate of inflation in that year.
Although this result may appear surprising, a diversified portfolio
with several sectors represented is more likely to achieve this independence than a portfolio concentrated in one asset form. For instance,
if inflation rises, the prices of domestic bonds will decrease and equities and property may fall in value. Short-term and overseas investments may increase in value. Carter (1991), in the development of an
Australian stochastic investment model, suggests that inflation
affects short-term rates positively but dividend yields and property
returns negatively and that share prices best are forecast as a separate white noise process independent from inflation.
Hence, in view of the assumed diversified nature of the investment portfolio and the lack of a clear relationship between the
returns on equities and inflation, a real rate of return independent
from the rate of inflation is considered reasonable. It is acknowledged that this investment model is a simplified one, but it is sufficiently realistic to enable this paper to concentrate on the benefits
arising from defined contribution funds and thereby to draw appropriate conclusions. Models that concentrate on interest rates (for
example, Becker (1991) and Tilley (1992)) have not been used due to
the assumed diversified portfolio of the fund.
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It also is recognized that pension and superannuation funds may
adopt a range of investment strategies. With this in mind, the results
allow for the following three investment strategies, each of which is
represented by a normal distribution.

a) Strategy A: N (J1 = 0.05 and
b) Strategy B: N (J1 = 0.03 and
c) Strategy C: N (J1 = 0.01 and

= 0.08).
(J = 0.05).
(J = 0.02).
(J

It should be noted that these three investment strategies represent, in

broad terms, the following three investment options:
a) Strategy A represents a managed or balanced fund with significant investments in equities and properties.
b) Strategy B represents a capital stable fund with significant fixed
interest investments and some equity investments.
c) Strategy C represents a fund invested predominantly in cash and
short-term stocks.
The appropriateness of the assumed figures is confirmed by
Humphreys and Newman (1993) who allow for an investment mix of
cash, bonds (Australian and overseas), equities (Australian and overseas), property, and currency each with its own sector statistics and
show a mean return (in excess of inflation) of 5.1 percent per annum
with a standard deviation of 8.2 percent for a fund with a balanced
asset mix and a mean of 3.9 percent per annum real and a standard
deviation of 4.8 percent for a fund with a stable asset mix. Further,
the Towers Perrin Superannuation Pooled Funds Survey (1993) of
Australian fund managers shows for the three years to June 3D, 1993
standard deviations of 5.8 percent, 7.6 percent, and 8.9 percent per
annum for the benchmarks for funds that have below average, average or above average volatility for their investment returns.
Within the model, the rate of return each year is calculated so
that 1 plus the nominal rate of return in year t is the product of 1
plus the inflation rate for year t and 1 plus the real rate of return for
year t, for the given investment strategy. It is possible for the nominal rate of return in a particular year to be negative due to a negative real rate of return for that year.
As will be shown later, this model also permits individuals to
change their investment strategies during their preretirement years,
which is similar to the concept of age phasing discussed in Kingston,
Piggot, and Bateman (1992). This possibility raises the question as to
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who directs the investment policy: the employer, the member, or the
trustees of the fund. A discussion of the advantages of each alternative is beyond the scope of this paper but is worthy of further
research.

3 Results
As indicated above, the model can assume a defined contribution
or a defined benefit approach. This paper initially will consider the
retirement income benefits that arise for a single male in his retirement from a defined contribution of 12 percent of salary throughout
his career. It is assumed that the full accumulated benefit at retirement is converted into an inflation-linked lifetime annuity.
Table 1 presents the results based on the following assumptions,
except where an alternative assumption is noted.
Basic Assumptions
Entry age: ........................................................................................ 20
Exit age: .......................................................................................... 65
Participation: ...................................................... full time throughout
Inflation rate-mean: ............................................. 4 percent per annum
Inflation rate-standard deviation ........................ 4 percent per annum
Investment strategy A-mean .......................... 5 percent per annum real
Investment strategy A-standard deviation ........... 8 percent per annum
Investment rate after retirement.. .................. 1 percent per annum real
Salary growth-productivity ................................. 1 percent per annum
Salary growth-promotion ..................................... 1 percent per annum
Mortality after retirement ................ Australian Life Tables 1985-1987

The investment rate of return after retirement has been assumed to be
5 percent per annum (i.e., 1 percent in excess of the mean long-term
inflation rate), as it is assumed that the institution offering the
indexed lifetime annuity will adopt a more conservative investment
strategy than in the preretirement period.
Table 1 indicates the spread of results that arise from 1,000 simulations undertaken for each set of assumptions by showing the mean,
standard deviation, the 5th percentile, and the 95th percentile for
the 1,000 results produced under each scenario. One thousand simulations is sufficient to produce a stable set of results.
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TABLE 1
The Indexed Retirement Income That can be Purchased
With a 12 Percent Contribution Rate

Assumption
Base assumptions
Female
Married male with spouse
(2/3rds reversionary pension)
Changes in entry or exit ages
Retirement age 60
Retirement age 55
Ages of 25 and 60
Retirement age 60 ~female)
Retirement age 55 female)
Ages of 25 and 60 (female)
Changes in investment
assumption or strategy
Strategy A with (J =6%
Strategy B
StrategyC
A for 35 years, then B
A for 35 years, then C
A for 25 years, then B for 10
years, then C

Retirement Income Expressed as a Percentage of Final Salary
Standard
5th
95th
Mean
Deviation
Percentile
Percentile
84.66
67.81
62.12

30.28
24.42
22.44

46.17
36.82
33.74

142.71
114.15
104.60

56.98
38.22
45.52
46.52
31.91
37.17

19.12
11.90
14.05
15.74
10.03
11.58

31.78
22.11
27.16
25.56
18.43
21.97

93.11
61.12
71.76
76.17
51.37
58.51

84.69
52.74
34.53
71.12
59.64
51.81

22.78
11.17
3.64
21.57
15.91
11.10

54.09
36.93
29.10
43.38
38.33
36.29

126.84
73.01
41.25
111.15
88.34
71.44

Changes in participation rates (part time is considered 40% of full time)
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40,
71.58
24.89
39.72
then fit
fit to age 25, then zero to age
48.24
14.89
28.69
35, then pit to age 45, then fit
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40,
57.33
20.08
31.90
then fit (female)
fit to age 25, then zero to age
38.63
12.03
22.92
35, pit to age 45, then fit
(female)
Changes in inflation and annuity assumptions
84.81
Inflation N(4%,6%)
Inflation N(7%,7%) with annu85.35
ity at 8% per annum
Annuity at inflation +0%
77.80
Annuity at inflation +1%
83.38
Annuity at inflation +2%
89.16
Career average-indexed
119.75

117.71
75.12
94.14
60.69

31.46
31.31

45.63
45.72

143.62
143.80

27.69
29.64
31.65
42.90

42.13
45.20
48.36
64.92

130.36
139.80
149.58
199.00

The most important result shown in Table 1 is the significant
spread of the level of retirement income received by individuals who
have contributed the same percentage of salary for the same number
of years. For instance, using the base assumptions the average retirement income arising from a contribution of 12 percent of salary for 45
years is an indexed lifetime annuity equivalent to 84.66 percent of
the person's final salary. Due to the uncertain investment returns
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achieved each year, however, there exists a considerable spread of
results. The level of retirement income is equally likely to be 46 percent or 143 percent of final salary, and these are not the extreme values! Figure 1 shows the distribution of these results.
Figure 1
Retirement Income as a Percentage of Final Income
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The model also allows for taxation on contributions and/or
investment earnings. Table 2 shows the results assuming a 15 percent
tax on contributions (which is the tax rate payable in Australia on
employer contributions) and a 7.5 percent tax on investment income.
This represents a typical investment income tax rate paid by funds in
Australia after allowing for dividend imputation and other credits.
The tax on the resulting benefits also is reduced, but this is not shown
as these tax rates vary by income and benefit size.
The major message coming from the results in Tables 1 and 2 and
Figure 1 is that a considerable variation occurs in the ultimate level
of retirement income received by individuals, even if a level contribution rate is assumed to be paid for 40 or 45 years. In essence, a system
that defines a set level of contributions cannot define the level of
benefits received. With the trend toward defined contribution plans,
it is critical that fund members, employers, and policy makers appreciate that the prescribed level of contributions will not provide sufficient retirement income for many retirees, even if, on average, it is
satisfactory under certain circumstances. It is worth stressing that
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TABLE 2
Indexed Retirement Income That can be Purchased With a 12 Percent
Contribution Rate After A"owing
for a 15 Percent Contributions Tax and a 7.5 Percent Investment Tax

Assumption
Base assumptions
Female
Married male with spouse
Changes in entry or exit ages
Retirement age 60
Retirement age 55
Ages of 25 and 60
Retirement age 60 (female)
Retirement age 55 (female)
Ages of 25 and 60 (female)

Retirement Income Expressed as a Percentage of Final Salary
Standard
5th
95th
Mean
Deviation
Percentile
Percentile
61.10
44.84

19.83
16.02
14.73

35.08
28.10
25.69

98.12
79.28
72.77

41.97
28.74
34.24
34.27
24.00
27.96

12.87
8.24
9.70
10.61
6.96
8.01

24.44
17.61
21.54
19.76
14.66
17.36

66.44
44.80
52.05
54.27
37.42
42.49

15.04
7.81
2.73
14.28
10.65
7.55

40.39
28.73
23.08
33.34
29.90
28.56

89.17
54.36
32.19
78.54
64.27
52.39

48.94

Changes in Investment assumptions or strategy
Strategy A with 0' = 6%
61.12
Strategy B
39.95
Strategy C
27.29
A for 35 years, then B
52.05
A for 35 years, then C
44.28
A for 25 years, then B for 10
39.01
years, then C

Changes in participation rates (part time is considered 40% of full time)
51.87
16.29
30.32

fit to age 30, then pit to age 40,
then fit
fit to age 25, then zero to age
35, then pit to age 45, then fit
fit to age 30, then pit to age 40,
then fit (female)
fit to age 25, then zero to age
35, pit to age 45, then fit

81.08

35.68

9.89

22.40

53.92

41.55

13.16

24.25

65.67

28.58

8.01

17.83

43.73

20.84
19.79

34.56
33.46

99.87
97.11

18.13
19.40
20.72

32.18
34.53
33.96

90.13
96.58
103.09

(female)
Changes in inflation and annuity assumptions
Inflation N(4%,6%)
61.29
Inflation N(7%,7%) with annu58.89
ity at 8% per annum
Annuity at inflation +0%
56.15
Annuity at inflation +1%
60.18
Annuity at inflation +2%
64.35

this inadequacy most likely will occur for a particular generation or
cohort of retirees and not for retirees from a particular plan. For
example, if the economy is depressed for a number of years (causing
reduced investment returns), then all members of defined contributions
plans will be affected. The effects could be particularly adverse for
those approaching retirement who may find that the real value of
their accumulated retirement benefits is declining. Such a result could
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lead to a cohort of retirees with lower living standards for their
retirement.
This result is not surprising when one recalls that within the
operation of a defined contribution plan the rate credited to the
member's account each year normally is linked to the fund's actual
investment performance. Although funds in some countries may choose
to smooth this rate, there is no doubt that the final benefit received
by the individual largely is determined by the investment performance of the fund during the individual's working career. The
investment risk that is borne by members of defined contribution plans
translates into a risk that affects postretirement living standards.
This is in contrast to a defined benefit fund where the retirement
benefit is defined in terms of final (or final average) salary and the
employer's contribution rate normally is adjusted to reflect changes in
the investment return.
One method to reduce the variability in the level of retirement
income received by the individual is the adoption of an investment
strategy with less volatility, as assumed for Strategies B or C.
While such an approach reduces the variability in the ultimate
level of income, as shown in Table I, a reduction in the level of
retirement income also occurs. It is worth noting that, based on the
model used, the 95th percentile for the low risk Strategy C represents
a lower income than the 5th percentile for the higher risk Strategy
A option. Similar results would be expected if other investment models were used.
A commonly suggested alternative is for individuals to reduce
their level of investment risk as they approach retirement. Tables 1
and 2 show that while such a move reduces the variability in the
level of retirement income received, it also reduces the expected
income to be received. The expected income for the strategy involving
the three investment options is below the 5th percentile for Strategy
A. This result does not mean that a policy to reduce the volatility of
investment return is inappropriate as individuals approach retirement. It does mean that the likely impact of such a move on the
resulting income must be recognized.
The results also highlight the importance of realistic assumptions in any modeling, including variations in the rate of return. It is
interesting to note that if the variations in inflation and investment
returns are removed, the level of retirement income is 84.97 percent of
final earnings (close to the mean). Such a single figure provides no
indication of the variability in the likely results, however.
Table 1 also confirms the following results:
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a) Early retirement causes a significant reduction in the level of
retirement income due to the shorter accumulation period and the
extended period of retirement. A retirement age of 60 causes a
32.7 percent reduction for males and a 31.4 percent reduction for
females. These significant reductions in the level of retirement
income need to be appreciated, particularly with recent worldwide trends toward earlier retirement.
b) Later entry into the work force, as is occurring with higher levels
of youth unemployment and increasing years of education, also
results in a lower level of retirement income due to the shorter
period of accumulation. This reduction can be offset if the
Increased period of education raises the level of lifetime earnings.
c) These two trends, of later entry and earlier retirement, can have
a devastating effect on the ultimate level of benefit. For instance,
the expected retirement income with an entry age of 25 and a
retirement age of 60 is 54 percent for males and 55 percent for
females of the income received by a person who enters at age 20
and retires at age 65.
d) Changes in the investment strategy have the expected result
with higher variability if the risk (as measured by the standard
deviation) is increased and a reduced mean and variability if
more conservative investment options are chosen. If Strategy C is
chosen, the mean retirement income is reduced 59 percent while
the standard deviation is reduced 88 percent.
e) If the standard deviation for Strategy A is reduced (which may
occur within a prolonged low inflation environment and/or with
greater smoothing of the investment returns), the expected value
is almost unchanged, whereas the standard deviation and the
range between the 5th and 95th percentiles are both reduced 25
percent.
£) Female life expectancy is considerably higher than males. Based
on the Australian Life Tables 1985-1987, a 65 year old female is
expected to live 18.56 years (or 27.1 percent longer than a male).
When the retirement benefit is expressed in terms of a lifetime
annuity, females receive a smaller level of income for the same
level of contributions. Using the base assumptions, the expected
level of income for a 65 year old female retiree is 20.0 percent
below her male counterparts. (Within the Australian context,
gender-based annuity rates are permitted.)
g) The previous discussion relates only to full-time workers. As
expected, those who experience some periods of part-time work or
wno temporarily leave the work force have reduced retirement
incomes. For instance, working in a part-time capacity for ten
years from age 30 reduces the expected retirement income 15.5
percent for both males and females. Naturally, larger reductions
in the expected retirement income occur if the person spends more
time out of the work force.
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h) Changes to the assumed mean of the inflation level do not cause
a significant change to the results, as the investment returns and
salary increases are adjusted automatically. As expected, an
increase in the standard deviation of the inflation distribution
leads to an increased variability in the level of retirement
income.
i) Table 2 highlights the impact of a 15 percent tax on contributions
and a 7.5 percent tax on investment income. The expected level of
benefits is reduced 27.8 percent for both males and females under
the base conditions. Even if there is a reduction in the taxation of
the retirement income (as occurs in Australia, with a 15 percent
tax rebate on pensions), it is likely that the introduction of taxation during the preretirement period (which has been considered
in other countries) will result in a reduction in the actual level of
retirement income received by the retiree.
j) The annuity rates offered at retirement to convert the accumulated benefit to a lifetime annuity can have a significant impact
on the ultimate level of retirement income. If the underlying
interest rate used to determine the indexed annuity rate increases
from 1 percent above the inflation figure in the year preceding
retirement to 2 percent above this inflation rate, the expected
level of the annUIty increases 6.9 percent.
This last result is -important for members of defined contribution
plans, as the actual level of any lifetime annuity will depend on the
annuity rates available at the date of conversion. This represents a
one-off conversion. The annuity rate used becomes critical in determining the actual level of retirement income received if the lump sum
benefit is to be converted into an annuity stream at the date of
retirement. In reality, such a system represents a random event,
within certain bounds, where the level of retirement income can vary
significantly due to the actual date of retirement even when all
other factors are identical. Most members of defined contribution
plans are not aware of this annuity rate risk that they bear whenever their retirement benefit is not expressed as a defined pension in
terms of final (or final average) salary and they are required to convert their accumulated benefit into an income form. One approach to
overcome this problem is to provide retirees with a fixed period
(say, five years) during which they must convert their benefit into an
annuity. Such an approach removes the one-off option while maintaining the requirement to convert their accumulation into an income
stream.
The above results highlight the risks associated with variable
investment returns and the provision of retirement benefits through a
defined contribution approach. These risks cannot be removed without
adopting a conservative investment strategy. Naturally, such a deci-
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sion will result in lower benefits or higher long-term contribution
rates. Neither of these results are optimal. An important but often
forgotten question that needs to be addressed on a regular basis is:
Who should bear the investment risk associated with the accumulation of contributions over the long term for the provision of retirement
income? Should it be the employer, the individual, the government,
or a combination of these parties?
This question has been answered in a variety of ways over time
and in different countries. In some instances, the government (and
hence the taxpayers) has removed the investment risk with the
development of a generous social security system. This approach
introduces other risks, including demographic and political risk.
Elsewhere, defined pension schemes are common and the sponsoring
employer has accepted the investment risk during the preretirement
period. Even in these instances, certain risks remain. The trend
toward defined contribution plans means that a higher proportion of
the risks associated with the provision of retirement income is being
accepted by the individual member. It may be claimed that with
greater individual responsibility and a relative decline in the importance of the welfare state, this represents an appropriate response. It
is also important, however, that individuals are aware of the consequences of the investment risk associated with defined contribution
plans.

4 Summary and Conclusions
In recent years, there has been a shift from defined pension
schemes to defined contribution schemes in several countries for a
variety of reasons. This trend has placed a greater level of responsibility for retirement income on the individual member. Within this
changed environment, individual members need to ask questions such
as:
a) yvhat. is an appropriate level of contribution to provide security
In rehrement1
b) What are the major risks involved and who bears them?
The results in this paper, based on a simulation model using stochastic estimates for investment returns and the level of inflation, assist
in preparing a response to these questions.
The results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that a total superannuation
contribution rate of 9 percent to 10 percent of salary (assuming no taxation in the preretirement period) or 12 percent of salary (with taxa-
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tion at the Australian levels) provides, on average, a reasonable
retirement income in terms of final salary for a single male, assuming
that the contributions have been paid for at least 40 years. It is
important to stress that these figures ignore any social security benefits. Therefore, the contribution levels should be reduced where a
social security pension also is received. The results also represent
average results; it is likely that at some time in the future, a particular cohort of retirees who have saved for 40 or 45 years will receive
an inadequate retirement income due to the variability of the
investment returns during the preretirement period.
Even if we concentrate on the average result (which does not represent the total story), a 9 percent to 10 percent contribution rate
(assuming the tax exempt scenario) is not sufficient for many individuals. Some of the circumstances where a higher contribution rate is
needed include:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Females who have longer life expectancies.
Members with dependent spouses.
Individuals who choose or are forced to take early retirement;
Individuals who enter the work force later due to early periods
of unemployment or increased education.
e) Individuals who do not work full time throughout their career.
In many cases, an individual may be subject to a number of these factors (e.g., a female with some part-time work experience who retires
at age 60) which would result in the need for a high contribution rate
if a reasonable retirement income benefit is to be provided.
When one considers the small proportion of the work force who
will be employed full time for 40 or 45 years and the variability in
the investment returns over the long term, it is reasonable to conclude
that a contribution rate equal to 9 percent of earnings will not provide an adequate level of retirement income for most retirees. This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the above figures exclude
any allowance for expenses.
Due to the enormous variety of individual circumstances, it is
impossible to select a long-term contribution rate that will be satisfactory to everyone. In view of the current results, a total contribution
rate for retirement income in the order of 12 percent of earnings (in a
tax exempt environment) may be a reasonable long-term objective for
many individuals. A higher contribution rate would be required if
the fund were subject to taxation during the preretirement accumulation period.
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Discussion of David Knox's "A Critique of Defined
Contribution Plans Using a Simulation Approach"
Michael Sze*

Professor David Knox is to be congratulated for this timely
paper, which discusses a topic of major social and economic importance in many countries. Although the author's principal interest is
Australia, the general trend of conversion from defined benefit plans
to defined contribution plans has been the topic of many research
projects in the United States and in Canada. Depending upon the
emphasis of the research performed, different surveys have arrived
at different conclusions. Participation in both types of plans has been
relatively stable after 1984 according to Trends in Pensions 1992
(published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare
Benefit Administration 1992).
The stochastic approach toward analyzing the benefits provided
by defined contribution plans is useful. Additional research may be
done, however, to extend the methodology to include simulating
inflation, salary increases, and each asset class separately. Statistics
in the U.S. indicate that inflation is correlated negatively with
many asset classes, and the impact of inflation of on different assets
classes are different (d. Sze, 1993, p. 43).
Another area worthy of further research is the impact of changing investment policy during the active career of the employee. A
concept that has received wide acceptance in the U.S.A. is life cycle
investment. The underlying principle of life cycle investment is
straight forward. It promotes the discipline of matching the time
horizon of investments to that of the retirement needs of the
employee. Let us use the three most common asset classes-stocks,
bonds. and cash-to illustrate the principle. Of these asset classes,
statistics show that stocks have the highest expected return and the
highest volatility. Cash is the most stable and has the lowest

* Michael Sze is a Fellow of both the Society of Actuaries and the Canadian Institute
of Actuaries. He received his Ph.D. degree in mathematics from the Ohio State
University and currently is a partner of Hewitt Associates. He is the chair of the
Society of Actuaries Retirement Systems Research Committee, as well as a member of
the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Investment Practice Committee.
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expected return. The behavior of bonds lies between stocks and cash.
For a young employee, the period to retirement is long. Thus, the
investment portfolio should include more stocks. As the employee
ages, retirement needs become more imminent and risk tolerance
decreases. There should be a gradual shift toward fixed income
investments. It would be instructive to examine the advantage of such
an adaptable investment policy.
The paper mentions the risk of changing annuity purchase rate on
conversion of the defined contribution balance to a stream of defined
benefits upon retirement. Such a risk is genuine. One way that one
may reduce such a conversion risk is to match the duration of assets
to the duration of the expected benefit payment stream. Most insurance companies are heavily invested in fixed income assets. Thus,
annuity purchase rates typically reflect the investment atmosphere
of fixed income assets. If a life cycle investment policy is adopted,
most of the investment in years preceding retirement should be in
fixed income investments. Matching asset and benefit cash flow is not
a difficult process. If such an exercise is performed and continually
updated, the annuity purchase risk is reduced greatly. An area for
further defined contribution research is to assess the impact of
asset/benefit matching before retirement.
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Author's Reply to Discussion
Michael Sze has raised a number of issues worthy of furth~r
research: in particular, the effect of a more sophisticated inflation
and/ or investment model, changing investment policy during the life
cycle and the possible matching of assets to pension liabilities. to
reduce the annuity rate risk.
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I agree that each of these areas is suitable for further work. It
must be realized, however, that as one becomes more particular with
respect to life cycle decisions or investment models or policy, the
results can be applied only to a proportion of pension fund members.
Of course, this does not reduce the value of such research, but it does
make the work more specific.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify, at least to some extent,
the risks borne by members in defined contribution arrangements.
Actuaries always have been aware of the different risk-takers in
defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Many plan members
and industry commentators, however, have no idea of the possible
implications of belonging to defined contribution plans over the longer
term. The results in this paper represent one way of illustrating these
inherent risks to nonactuaries.
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The Definition of Insurance: Implications for a Health
Insurance Demand Model
Mark J. 8rowne*

Abstract
This paper uses data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care Expenditures Survey to
evaluate five different measures of insurance: a family's expected out-of-pocket payment for medical care, the expected value of the indemnity (fee-for-service) benefits
from an insurance policy for a family, the percentage of the expected loss that the
insured pays, the policy premium, and the policy limit of coverage.
The study provides information that can help us understand whose insurance coverage will change significantly as a result of health care reform. For example, it
shows that those with low income (such as minorities, families headed by females,
and unmarried individuals) on average purchase low amounts of health insurance.
These groups would benefit considerably if health care reform institutes universal coverage. Conversely, whites, families headed by males, married individuals, and those
with high incomes on average have considerable health insurance coverage.
Key words: measures oj insurance, out-oj-pocket expenses, indemnity beneJits

1 Introduction
Several different measures of insurance have been used by
researchers to quantify a family'S level of insurance coverage. This
paper compares five different measures of insurance coverage using
group insurance data from the 1977-78 National Medical Care
Expenditure Survey.1 The measures that are used in this study were
chosen because they have been used by other researchers to develop
• Mark J. Browne is an assistant professor of risk management and insurance at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received his Ph.D. from the Wharton School of
the University of Pennsylvania in 1989. He currently is a member of the American Risk
and Insurance Association, the American Economics Association, the Western Risk and
Insurance Association, and the Risk Theory Seminar.
1 The National Medical Care Expenditures Survey was conducted during 1977 and 1978.
Data were collected from approximately 14,000 randomly chosen households throughout the United States. The richness of this data set allows the construction of the five
measures of insurance used in this study. Although this data set is now 16 years old, it
is the most current public data set available containing all of the necessary data for
this study.
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equations to predict (forecast) the demand for medical insurance.
Researchers have found that medical insurance demand equations
(estimated using the different measures of insurance as the dependent
variable) differ significantly in terms of the amount of variation
explained. In addition, the statistical significance of the explanatory
variables used in the models differs across models. Further, the estimated income elasticities 2 of the models vary widely.
Since the data for this study were collected, the health insurance
industry has undergone dramatic change. Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have captured a significant portion of the insurance
market. Similarly, preferred provider organizations (PPOs) have
grown rapidly in number and size. Managed care has become an
increasingly important means of controlling health care costs. Insurers
have moved from merely providing health care financing to an integral involvement in health care delivery. Insurers now regularly
review the appropriateness of medical care prior to agreeing to pay
for it. 3
More profound changes are expected in the future as leaders in
both political parties push for reform in health care financing and
health care delivery. Among the measures currently being discussed
is a prohibition on most types of underwriting and a requirement that
employers purchase health insurance for all employees, including
those who work only part time. Mandatory purchase of health insurance coupled with community rating would alter the consumption of
health insurance greatly. The health insurance market today provides a myriad of different products that reflect individual and
group preferences. Depending on the form of health care reform
enacted, if any, individual choice in the market may be reduced significantly.
The current study provides extensive information on the types of
health insurance persons demand in the absence of a government
mandate that everyone has insurance. The study focuses on traditional indemnity (fee-for-service) insurance. A major advantage of
indemnity insurance is that it does not restrict the insured's choice of
provider. President Clinton's proposal calls for the formation of
health alliances and for each health alliance to offer a choice of at
Income elasticity is the ratio of the proportionate change in consumption of a good
relative to a proportionate change in income, with prices held constant.

2

The data used for this study preclude an analysis of policies that incorporate managed care. Managed care may increase or decrease the value of an insurance contract to
an insured. Managed care programs that limit an insured's ability to collect indemnification benefits will reduce the policy's value to the insured. Programs that contribute
to the insured receiving the best possible care provide enhanced value.
3
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least one indemnity insurance policy and one HMO policy. While
HMOs and PPOs have grown considerably during the last 20 years,
indemnity insurance continues to dominate the market.
The different ways to measure health insurance discussed in this
study provide insights into what it means to have health insurance
coverage. Depending on the definition one uses to assess health insurance coverage, a particular policy may be perceived to provide either
sufficient or insufficient coverage. The demand analysis provides significant insight into the perceived value of health insurance to various demographic groups. The findings in this study provide valuable
information for policy/decision makers and for health insurance
industry professionals.

2 The Measures of Insurance
There are two factors that make insurance particularly difficult
to quantify. First, insurance is purchased through an aleatory contract, which means that the payoff from the policy is uncertain and
subject to events in the future that mayor may not occur. Second, the
probability that an insurance contract actually will pay an indemnity benefit to an insured will depend upon the risk characteristics of
the insured as well as the provisions of the insurance contract.
Suppose an insurer sells identical policies (for the same price) to two
individuals whom it believes to be similar risks. It follows that the
insured who in fact is a greater risk will realize greater expected
benefit from the insurance. This occurs because the insurer assumes
more risk from the individual who is a higher risk than from the
individual who is a lower risk.
Before introducing the definitions of the various measures of
insurance, it is important to give an example of one model of an
insurance policy. Let Lij be the actual medical expenses incurred by
insured i for medical service j and Bij be the actual indemnity benefit
paid by the insurer out of the Lij expense. Then individual i's actual
out-of-pocket expense for service j is
OOPij

= Lij

(1)

- Bij.

The actual form of Bij depends on the specifics of the insurance
policy. For example, if there is a deductible of dij' a coinsurance percentage4 of 100aij% (0 ::;; aij ::;; 1), and an amount Mij beyond which the
insurance company pays for the entire excess loss, then Bij is given as:
The coinsurance percentage of 100 ai/fo is paid by the insured. Thus if aij is equal to
0.2, then the coinsurance percentage is 20 percent (100 x 0.2%).

4
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o

if Lij :::; dij

(1-aij)(Lij- d ij)

if dij < Lij :::; Mij

(1-aij)(Mij-dij) + (Lij-Mij) if Lij > Mij.

For many health plans, the deductibles and coinsurance payments
are applied to the insured's total annual expenses. So, let N be the
number of different types of medical services provided, and let Li and
Bi be the aggregate medical expenses and indemnity benefits, respectively. These aggregates are given by:

o

where di, 100atio (0 ::;; aij ::;; I), and M i are insured i's annual
deductible, coinsurance percentage, and the amount beyond which the
insurance company pays for all excess losses.
Some plans may have an upper limit on the annual losses that
will be paid, while others may have lifetime limits on the family's
medical expenses. Some plans offer deductibles that must apply to
each family member, in addition to an entire family deductible.
They also may have deductibles and co-payments that vary with the
medical provider utilized. For example, a certain group of physicians
may have negotiated with the plan to supply services under this
plan at an agreed set of charges. If an insured uses one of these
physicians, the deductibles and coinsurance payments are usually
lower, and the upper limit M may be lower. Regardless of the type
of plan, one easily can obtain accurate estimates of an individual's
expected losses. Given the myriad of different health insurance
plans, however, it is not possible to give one equation for Bij or Bi. In
addition, for all but the very simplest of plans, the mathematical
form of the expected value of Bi or Bij will be complicated.
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Note: The approach used in this paper to yield expected out-ofpocket expenses and expected indemnity benefits is to apply the
plan's benefit formula to the expected losses. This is equivalent to
using the approximation E[g(X)] ~ g(E[X]) where g is a continuous
function and X is a real-valued random variable. This approximation
is exact if and only if g is a linear function of X.
It must be pointed out that the medical services used in this
study include outpatient physician costs, inpatient surgeon fees, hospital room and board changes, fees for diagnostic tests, prescription
medicine expense, and inpatient physician visits charges. Examples
of medical expenses not included in the study include home health
services, treatment in an extended care facility, and hospice care.
The premium and claim data were collected over an 18 month period
during 1977 and 1978.
Sections 2.1 through 2.5 contain a description of the five measures.

2.1 Expected Out-of-Pocket Payments For Medical Care
(/1)
The measure I1i is defined as:

where N is the number of different medical services included in the
definition and E[OOPijl is the expected out-of-pocket expense for the
jlh medical service for insured i, as defined in equation (1).
Several authors have used this measure. For example, Farley
(1985) used it in her study of underinsurance in the United States,
while Francis (1984) also used it in his evaluation of health
insurance policies made available to federal government employees.
As I1 is defined as the expected out-of-pocket expense for medical
care for a family, low values of the measure suggest extensive health
insurance coverage and high values indicate little coverage. Zero corresponds to full insurance coverage. For a given insurance policy, I1
increases as the family's predicted loss increases. 4 Similarly, for a
given expected loss, I1 decreases as the individual's policy provides
If the policy has a stop-loss, an increase in loss above the stop-loss will not change
this measure of insurance coverage.

4
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greater coverage of the 10ss.5 A policy may provide greater coverage
of a loss through a variety of policy provisions such as a lower
deductible, less coinsurance, higher limits, or a broader definition of
covered losses.

2.2 Expected Indemnity Benefits From Insurance (/2)
This measure of insurance, 12, is used by Browne (1989) in his
study of adverse selection in the individual health insurance market.
Following Browne, this measure is defined as:

that is, 12i is the expected indemnity benefit from the insurance policy owned by insured i. The size of the expected benefit depends on
the expected medical expense of insured i and the provisions of the
insurance policy owned by insured i.
12 is similar to the pure (or net) premium of a single insurance
policy. The pure premium is the portion of the insurance premium
charged on behalf of the insured to cover the anticipated cost of
claims. 12 is the expected value of benefits for an insured with a particular insurance policy and a particular set of risk characteristics. It
must be pointed out that 12 differs from the pure premium of the
insured's insurance policy both to the extent that the loss prediction
algorithm used in this paper differs from that used by insurance company actuaries and to the extent that the data in this study differ
from that used by insurers in establishing rates.
12 will increase as expected losses increase for any given individual or family insurance policy. Likewise, the value of 12 will
increase with the depth of coverage for an expected loss of a given
amount. Because this measure takes into account the risk characteristics of the insured as well as the insurance policy provisions, it incorporates more information than simply the limits of coverage. It is a
more appealing measure of insurance than Il, as it represents how
much insurance the policy provides rather than how little.

For instance, suppose a family's expected medical expense is $250. This family will
have more insurance by measure 11 if the policy has a $100 deductible than if the policy has a $200 deductible. Applying the plan's benefit formula to the family's
expected medical expense yields 11 = $100 if the policy has a $100 deductible. I1 =
$200 if the policy has a $200 deductible.
5
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2.3 Expected Out-ot-Pocket Payments/Expected Losses
(/3)
The third measure of insurance, 13, is the ratio of the insured's
expected out-of-pocket payments for medical services to the total cost
of the medical services, that is, for insured i,

Clearly 13i ranges in value from zero to one. Zero corresponds to full
insurance and one to no insurance.
This measure of insurance differs from the coinsurance percentages
that are stated in insurance policies. Stipulated policy coinsurance
percentages apply to actual losses and may vary by the type of loss.
For instance, the policy may stipulate one coinsurance percentage for
prescription drugs and another for ambulatory surgery.
Because measure 13 is the fraction of the expected loss retained
by the insured, it is similar to an aggregate coinsurance percentage.
Here the aggregate coinsurance percentage is defined as the portion
of total medical expenses that will be paid by the insured rather
than by the insurer.
One factor that makes 13 an ambiguous measure in certain situations is that it does not increase monotonically with the size of the
expected loss. An example illustrates the problem. Consider the following situation. An insured has an insurance policy with the following provisions:
Deductible
Coinsurance Limit

$1,000
Insurer pays 80 percent of loss amount above
$1,000 and below $5,000. The insurer pays 100 percent of loss amounts between $5,000 and $10,000.
There is no insurance coverage for loss amounts in
excess of $10,000.

Let L be the actual loss incurred and B be the actual indemnity
benefit; then:
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if L .$" 1,000

0.8 (L - 1,000)

if 1,000

.$" L .$" 5,000

3,200 + (L - 5,000)

if 5,000

.$" L .$" 10,000

8,200

if L

~

10,000.

The aggregate coinsurance percentage,
a(agg)

a(agg),

is given by

L-B
B
= -L= 1-[

i.e.,

a(agg)

=

1

if 0

800
0.2 + T

if 1,000

.$" L .$" 5,000

1,800
L

if 5,000

.$" L .$" 10,000

1-

8,~00

if L

.$" L .$"

1,000

~ 10,000.

In this case, 13 is of the same form as a(agg), but with L replaced by
E[L]. The graph below shows how measure 13 varies as the expected
loss increases. Note that insurance coverage ends at $10,000. Beyond
$10,000, 13 increases asymptotically to 1.00.
Suppose two persons have the individual policy described above,
but they have different expected losses. Individual A has an
expected loss of LA = $2,667 while individual B has an expected loss
of LB = $16,400 such that they have the same value of 13 (0.5). Does
this mean that they have the same level of insurance? 13 cannot distinguish these two cases. Further, if another individual, C, also purchases the same policy but has expected losses of Lc = $6,000 such
that the value of 13 is 0.3. This implies that C had less coverage
than A, which is not true.
13, however, does not suffer this problem if the policy provides
unlimited coverage or if expected losses do not exceed the limits of
the policy.
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Figure 1
The Influence of the Expected Loss Amount on 13
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2.4 The Insurance Premium (/4)
The fourth measure of insurance, 14, is the premium paid for
insurance coverage by or on behalf of the insured. This measure of
insurance has been used widely by insurance researchers (for example
Farley and Wilensky (1983) and Beenstalk et al. (1988)). An advantage of this measure is that it is relatively easy to obtain and does
not require as much information to calculate as the prior three measures.
In a competitive insurance market the premium not only includes
expected losses, but also includes a loading for the company's
expenses, profits, and investment income. In a market that is not competitive, insurers may earn excess profits that would be included in
the premium. Because the level of company expenses, interest earnings, and any excess profits do not change the amount of insurance a
policy is contractually obligated to provide, but do affect the size of
the premium, this is not a perfect measure of insurance. For instance,
if a company is able to exercise monopoly power in one state but not
another, it may charge more for an identical policy in the state
where it exercises monopoly power than for the policy in the state
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where it does not exercise monopoly power. 6 The company is not providing any more protection in the state where it charges more than in
the state where it charges less. In addition, an insurance policy premium may be an inaccurate measure of coverage if market premium
rates lag changes in underlying medical expenses.

2.5 Limit of Coverage (/5)
The fifth measure of insurance, IS, is the limit of coverage specified in the insurance policy agreement. This measure of insurance is
used by Phelps (1973). The limit of insurance specified in the insurance policy agreement is a characteristic of the insurance agreement
and does not reflect the risk characteristics of the insured explicitly.
Insurance policies often have more than one limit. Among the different limits that may be used as a measure of the coverage a health
insurance policy provides are the number of hospital days covered
and the maximum payment for a surgical procedure. The limit used in
this paper is the lifetime maximum dollar limit of total benefits
provided by the insurance policy.
IS is defined here as the maximum amount of insurance protection
that a policy will provide. The measure does not account for the differences in risk exposure inherent to different insureds. The measure
also may give an imprecise indication of the amount of insurance a
policy provides because it focuses exclusively on one policy provision
to the exclusion of all others. Further, it is unlikely that an insured
will reach the policy limit. With IS, two insurance policies with the
same limit but different deductibles would not be distinguishable.

2.6 A Comparison of the Measures of Insurance
Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum insurance coverage for the 1977-78 sample population used in
this study, employing the five measures of insurance?
A procedure developed by Duan et ai. (1983) was modified to predict medical expenses. Insurance policy provisions of the insureds in
the sample are applied to the predicted losses to determine the
value of insurance company indemnity benefits and the amount of the
loss that is borne by the insured. Predicted expenses and insurance
There is little evidence that health insurers currently exercise monopoly power in the
U.s. Further, health insurers' profitability is limited in many states by minimum loss
ratio requirements.

6

7

The average medical care cost for an individual for 1994 is roughly $2500.
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indemnity benefits are summed across family members to determine
totals for families. Ex ante predicted values for the random variables
Il,12, and 13 then were constructed.
In the Duan et al. study, aggregate medical expenses were predicted. In the current study, losses are predicted for each person in
the sample for each of six types of medical expenses: outpatient
physician fees, inpatient surgeon fees, inpatient physician
(nons urge on) fees, hospital room and board charges, fees for diagnostic tests, and prescription medicine expenses. Health insurance policies typically have different coverage provisions for different types
of losses. The number of medical services for which loss amounts were
predicted was limited by the availability of medical insurance data
in the National Medical Care Expenditures Survey. The survey provides
extensive insurance coverage information for the medical services
used in the study but not for all medical services.
TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics of the Measures of Insurance
Based on 1977-78 Data
Measure
11

12

13
14
15

Mean

236.94
417.99
0.41
1012.95
262,967.68

Standard Deviation

Minimum

o
o

210.47
450.58
0.27
660.90
315,505.27

o

21.0
1,000.00

Maximum

2052.20
5546.10
1.00
5798.20
5,000,000.00

11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses
14: Insurance premium
15: Limit of coverage

A simple example illustrates how the different measures of
insurance coverage can conflict. Consider two families, one in good
health, the other in poor health. The two families have almost
identical insurance policies that cover all medical expenses after a
deductible. The deductible on the policy held by the healthy family
is $50. The family that is in poor health has a policy with a $100
deductible. Expected losses are $75 for the healthy family and
$1,000 for the less healthy family. Suppose the insurance premium
charged on behalf of each family is 120 percent of its expected loss.
The expected loss is assumed to be known by the insurer. Measure I1
for the healthy family is $50 and $100 for the less healthy family.
With I1 as the measure of insurance, the healthy family has more
insurance than the less healthy family because I1 is less. A cursory
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examination of the policies would lead to the same conclusion, as the
healthy family's policy is identical in all regards to that of the less
healthy family except that it has a lower deductible.
Now consider how these families compare by the other measures
of insurance. If measure 12 is considered as the appropriate measure
of insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the
healthy family has. The expected insurance indemnity benefit for
the healthy family is $25, whereas for the less healthy family the
expected benefit is $900. By measure 13, the percent of the total
expected losses covered by insurance, the less healthy family has
more insurance than the healthy family. The insurer will pay 90
percent of the less healthy family's medical expenses, but only 33
percent of the healthy family's losses. With 14 as the measure of
insurance, the less healthy family has more insurance than the
healthy family. Recall that premiums are assumed to be 120 percent
of expected medical expenses for both families and the expected medical expense of the less healthy family is greater than that of the
healthy family. Finally, with IS as the measure of insurance, both
families have an equal amount of insurance because both have a policy that provides unlimited coverage above the deductible. A summary of the example is provided in Table 2.
TABLE 2

An Illustrative Example of the Insurance Measures
Policy Provisions

Healthy Family

Deductible
Expected Losses
Limit of Coverage
Measures of Coverage
11
12
13
14
15

Sickly Family

$50

$100
$1,000
Unlimited

$50
$25

$100

$75
Unlimited

67%

$90

Unlimited

$900
10%

$1,200
Unlimited

11: Out-of-pocket payments for medical care
12. Indemnity benefits from insurance
13: Out-of-pocket payments/expected losses
14: Insurance premium
15: Limit of coverage

3 The Medical Expense Insurance Demand Model
This section of the paper specifies and estimates medical expense
insurance demand equations for each of the five measures of insurance.
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3.1 Specification of the Demand Model
For any of the measures of insurance (1) defined above, it is
assumed that the medical expense insurance demand equation can be
written, for family t, as:

t = 1,2, ... , N.
Here Xli is a column vector of explanatory variables pertaining to
the demographic characteristics of the family believed to affect the
demand for insurance, and X2t is a vector of explanatory variables
pertaining to the employment group through which the family
obtains insurance coverage. Recall that the insurance demand equations are estimated with group market data. /31 and /32 are vectors of
estimated coefficients corresponding to Xl and X 2, respectively. The
model's error term, et, is assumed to be normally distributed. 8
The family's demographic variables in the insurance demand
equation include its perceived health status, age of the head of
household, sex of the head of household, marital status, level of
education of the head of household, race of the head of household,
family income from all sources, family size, and region of the country.
The group characteristic variables include group size 9 and the share
of the insurance premium paid by the employer.
The family'S perceived health status is hypothesized to be correlated to the amount of insurance purchased. Theoretical studies of
the demand for insurance in a market with adverse selection support
this hypothesis (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977).
Phelps (1973) as well as others have found that age is correlated
positively with the amount of medical insurance purchased. One possible explanation for this correlation is that as one ages the variance
of losses increases, as does the average expected loss size.
The variable, female, has a value of one if the head of household is a female and a zero if a male. Prior studies have shown that
families headed by females typically have less medical insurance
than families headed by males (Farley and Wilensky, 1983).
Marital status is believed to be correlated positively with insurance purchases. Because medical expense insurance often is offered as
an employee benefit extending to other members of the immediate
A log transformation of the insurance measure was used in all but the 13 models. In
that model the log-odds transformation was used.

8

9 Group size is the size of the employment group through which the individual
acquires insurance coverage.
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family, the assumption is made that a married individual will be
more likely to have medical expense insurance coverage.
Education is hypothesized to be correlated positively with insurance consumption. Grossman's (1972) model of health care consumption
assumes that consumption of health care services increases one's stock
of human capital. Therefore, individuals with higher levels of human
capital will have a greater demand for medical insurance.
Four indicator variables are used to classify by race: black,
Hispanic, white, and other. Because these indicator variables must
sum to one, one must be omitted from the model. White is the omitted
variable in the model. Studies of medical expense insurance consumption by race have shown that whites are the greatest consumers of
medical expense insurance.
Phelps (1973) finds that income is correlated positively with
insurance purchases. As insurance is not a necessity, the indigent may
choose not to purchase it. As income increases, insurance becomes relatively more affordable. In addition the tax advantage to purchasing
group medical expense insurance is related positively to income. This
encourages a greater demand for insurance at higher income levels. A
priori, the effect of income on the consumption of insurance is not
clear, however. This is because those with higher incomes are more
capable of self-insuring than the poor. For a risk neutral person, selfinsuring may be preferable to purchasing insurance because of the
expenses associated with writing insurance. Due to the extreme losses
possible, self insurance usually is not opted for by persons who need to
protect their assets.
Nine indicator variables are used to classify insureds by region of
the country. These regions of the country are classified according to
the 1970 U.S. census. Eight of the variables are included as dependent variables in the insurance demand equation. The ninth variable
which represents the Pacific region is the omitted variable. These
variables are included to account for regional variations in the portion of the population with medical expense insurance. They also
account for the variation in the supply of medical care by region.
Five indicator variables are used to represent the area in which
the insured lives. The first includes the 16 largest standard
metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs). The second includes all
SMSAs (with the exception of the largest 16) that have a population
greater than 500,000. The third area consists of all SMSAs with a
population less than 500,000. The fourth includes areas that are not
SMSAs but that are less than 60 percent rural. The fifth includes
areas that are more than 60 percent rural. The first area variable,
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TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations For Insurance Demand Equation
Inde~endent and Omitted Variables
Independent Variable
Educat
Lfaminc*
Age
Female
Married
Area2
Area3
Area4
Area5
Black
Hisp
Other
Hunk
Hmrg
Hsales
Hclerk
Hcrafts
Hoper
Htrans
Hservv
Hlabor
Hfown
Hflabor
Physgood
Phsfair
Phspoor
Limmag
Limmat
Limmin
Neweng
Midatl
Encent
Wncent
Ssatl
Seast
Swest
Mnt
Lfamsize
Groupszp
Esharec
Omitted Variable
Male
Area1
White
Phsexl
Limmon
Pacific
Nmarried
Hprof

Definition
Years of education
Log of family income
Age in years
1 if female
1 if married
1 if SMSA > 500,000
1 if SMSA < 500,000
1 if not SMSA but < 60% rural
1 if not SMSA, rural
1 if Black
1 if Hispanic
1 if not black, His~anic, or white
1 if occupation un nown
1 if occupation managerial
1 if occupational sales
1 if occupational clerk
1 if occupational crafts
1 if occupational operator
1 if occupation transportation
1 if occupation service
1 if occupation labor
1 if occupation farm owner
1 if occupation farm laborer
1 if perceived health status good
1 if perceived health status fair
1 if perceived health status poor
1 if major activity limitation
1 if amount activity limitation
1 if minor activity limitation
1 if in corresponding 1~70 census region

Log of family size
Group size
Employers share of the premium
Definition
Male
Largest 16 SMSAs
White
Perceived health status excellent
No activity limitation
Pacific census region
1 if not married
Occupational professional

Mean

S.D.

12.26
21,342.21
39.93
0.17
0.71
0.25
0.19
0.20
0.13
0.09
0.04
0.02
0.10
0.10
0.05
0.07
0.16
0.13
0.05
0.09
0.05
0.01
0.Q1
0.39
0.10
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.16
0.22
0.08
0.20
0.06
0.07
0.03
3.17
20,342.88
0.74

3.18
16,554.88
12.26
0.37
0.45
0.43
0.39
0.40
0.33
0.29
0.19
0.12
0.30
0.31
0.21
0.22
0.37
0.34
0.23
0.29
0.22
0.10
0.07
0.49
0.30
0.14
0.12
0.17
0.15
0.20
0.37
0.42
0.27
0.40
0.23
0.25
0.18
1.67
71,180.67
0.32

Mean

S.D.

0.83
0.24
0.86
0.50
0.93
0.14
0.29
0.18

0.37
0.42
0.35
0.50
0.25
0.35
0.45
0.38

Absolute values not log values are reported in this table. The logs of the specified variables are
used in the regression
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representing the 16 largest SMSAs, is the omitted variable in the
model.
Two firm-specific explanatory variables are used in the model:
group size and the share of the insurance premium paid on behalf of
the insured family by the employer. Group size is assumed to be a
proxy for the price of insurance because group insurance can be provided more cheaply per person to members of larger groups. Thus, a
positive correlation is hypothesized between group size and insurance
purchases. A positive correlation also is hypothesized between the
employer's share of the premium and the consumption of medical
expense insurance. For a given insurance premium, the family's out-ofpocket cost drops as the employer's share of the premium increases.
Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation of the independent and omitted variables.

3.2 Estimation of the Demand Model
Table 4 reports the estimated medical insurance demand equations using each of the five different measures of insurance.
Parameter estimates and tests of their significance differ markedly
across equations. Of the five equations the R2 value is highest for
the I2 equation, expected insurance indemnity benefits.
Because the insurance policy premium has been used as the measure of insurance in most previous studies of insurance demand, the
demand model estimated with measure I4 serves as a benchmark for
comparison with other insurance demand models. The R2 value of 0.24
falls within the range of values of other models using this measure;
the R 2 value of the Farley and Wilensky model is 0.20, and that of
the Phelps model is 0.39. The estimated income elasticity of 0.18
falls within the range of previously estimated income elasticities for
a medical expense insurance demand model. 10 As hypothesized, the
coefficient estimates for the perceived health status variables are
correlated highly with the insurance premium, as is family income.
Families with a female head of household are less well insured in
general than those with a male head of household. The insurance
premium is related positively with family size and marital status,
as hypothesized.
The age of the head of household is not significant in the
demand equation. This may be attributable to the sample population
being limited to individuals under the age of 65. In addition, the
Holmer (1984) provides a discussion of the variation in estimated income elasticities. Phelps estimated an elasticity of 0.18, while Hoy estimated an elasticity of 0.02.

10
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TABLE 4
Insurance Demand Equations

0

c
....
:::I

~

Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables)
Independent
Variable

(Xl
~

Intercept
Educat
LFaminc
Age
Female
Married
Area2
Area3
Area4
Area5
Black
Hisp
Other
Hunk
Hmgr
Hsales
Hclerk
Hcrafts
Hoper
Htrans
Hserv

11 (R2=.33)

parameter
estimate t-stat
3.719
-2.22E-11
0.055
0.014
0.164
0.531
-0.111
-0.217
-0.253
-0.177
-0.050
-0.226
-0.171
-0.126
0.087
0.219
0.103
-0.022
0.103
0.015
-0.029

13.135
-0.330
1.961
9.638
2.659
9.664
-2.090
-4.106
-4.601
-2.783
-0.788
-2.149
-1.184
-1.765
1.344
2.558
1.299
-0.344
1.493
0.180
-0.413

12(R2=.39)

parameter
estimate t-stat
2.409
-0.004
0.064
0.030
0.003
0.410
-0.114
0.092
0.034
0.018
0.128
-0.306
0.682
0.032
0.183
0.006
0.145
0.248
0.276
0.122
-.373

6.645
-0.498
1.780
15.540
0.041
5.822
-1.678
1.362
0.481
0.223
1.577
-2.277
3.697
0.348
2.224
0.055
1.429
3.038
3.120
1.123
4.135

13*(R2=.06)

parameter
estimate t-stat
2.466
-0.004
0.061
-0.027
0.222
0.376
-0.177
-0.801
-0.812
-0.504
-0.133
0.264
-1.263
-0.186
-0.624
-0.111
-0.483
-0.767
-0.683
-0.525
-0.949

1.614
-0.111
0.401
-3.362
0.667
1.268
-0.617
-2.805
-2.732
-1.468
-1.468
0.466
-1.625
-0.486
-1.798
-0.241
-1.131
-2.227
-1.835
-1.144
-2.497

14(R2=.24)

parameter
estimate t-stat
4.541
20.336
-0.006
-1.063
0.18
8.283
0.003
2.405
-0.205
-4.210
0.207
4.755
-0.023
-0.555
0.024
0.584
-0.031
-0.709
-0.0074 -1.478
0.011
0.222
0.102
1.228
-0.105
-0.921
0.018
0.325
-0.099
-1.942
0.046
0.674
0.112
1.794
0.056
1.118
0.003
0.055
-0.004
-0.055
0.036
0.651

~

»

$l

15(R2=.07)

parameter
estimate

283032.720
4633.133
16883.677
-639.923
-9618.366
-12590.869
41224.128
15951.835
3269.112
-21039.910
24025.036
16399.984
82126.742
-42520.428
16277.970
-20834.308
18116.812
-20185.188
-56753.308
-12431.312
-5915.009

c
~
~

t-stat

"'U

2.566
1.769
1.545
-1.106
-0.400
-0.588
1.989
0.773
0.152
-0.847
0.962
0.401
1.463
-1.534
0.649
-0.624
0.588
-0.812
-2.110
-0.375
-0.829

il1

$l

o·

CD

<

~
......

-

Z
s:>
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......
<0
<0
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TABLE 4 (cont.)
Insurance Demand Equations

Ql

*
~

Measures of Insurance (Dependent Variables)

11 (R 2=.33)

(X)
(X)

Independent
Variable

parameter
estimate t-stat

Hlabor
Hfown
Hflabor
Phsgood
Phsfair
Phspoor
Limmaj
Limmamt
Limmin
Neweng
Midatl
Encent
Wncent
Ssatl
Seast
Swest
Mnt
Lfamsize
Groupszp
Esharec

0.063
-0.377
0.226
0.292
0.431
0.810
0.817
0.420
0.462
-0.145
-0.252
-0.270
-0.033
-0.018
-0.208
0.442
0.100
0.117
-0.014
-0.154

0.706
-1.892
0.977
8.126
7.227
6.359
5.589
4.259
4.274
-1.638
-3.762
-4.451
-0.456
-0.276
-2.356
5.755
0.988
3.102
-2.193
-2.767

12(R2=.39)

parameter
estimate t-stat
0.029
-0.452
0.544
0.259
0.683
1.087
0.832
0.938
0.169
0.799
0.637
0.558
0.493
0.267
0.021
-0.320
-0.185
0.065
0.029
0.145

0.253
-1.769
1.841
5.636
8.943
6.666
4.443
7.436
1.226
7.022
7.431
7.198
5.245
3.288
0.188
-3.254
-1.427
1.351
3.515
2.034

13*(R2=.06)

parameter
estimate t-stat
-0.324
-0.640
-0.813
-0.196
-0.762
-0.837
1.331
-0.512
0.231
-1.390
-1.176
-1.227
-0.910
-0.209
0.103
1.032
0.940
0.154
-0.080
-0.586

*The log-odds transformation was used to normalize the dependent variable

-0.674
-0.595
-0.654
-1.011
-2.370
-1.219
1.688
-0.963
0.397
-2.899
-3.259
-3.755
-2.297
-0.613
0.215
2.488
1.719
0.761
-2.261
-1.955

OJ

14(R2=.24)

parameter
estimate t-stat
0.030
0.117
0.005
-0.060
-0.058
-0.044
-0.190
-0.022
-0.014
0.044
-0.055
0.055
0.054
-0.143
-0.121
-0.135
0.049
0.157
0.015
0.050

0.434
0.746
0.028
-2.110
-1.231
-0.438
-1.644
-0.280
-0.170
0.629
-1.034
1.155
0.927
-2.853
-1.735
-2.232
0.618
5.294
3.003
1.139

15(R2=.07)

parameter
estimate

-25829.668
83648.331
-36384.059
1464.722
-16969.680
16195.869
-24068.161
2346.205
-374.051
-64783.774
-1 06592.340
-8516.062
-24259.950
-5314.145
-78952.442
-52285.950
10549.781
-33362.649
-14907.440
-44027.015

a::E

::l
(J)

t-stat
-0.744
1.076
-0.404
0.105
0.326
0.326
-0.422
0.061
-0.009
-1.870
-4.088
-0.361
-0.847
-2.153
-2.292
-1.746
-0.267
-2.279
-5.849
-2.034

0
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effect of age may be diluted because the ages of other individuals in
the family are not accounted for in the demand equation.
Both of the group characteristic explanatory variables are significant and exhibit the hypothesized relationship with the dependent
variable. A positive relationship between group size and insurance
consumption was hypothesized and is supported by the data. The
size of the employer portion of the insurance premium is related positively to the level of insurance purchase, as hypothesized.
The demand equations estimated using insurance measures I1 and
I2 exhibit the highest R2 values of the five models. The measures
are related to one another by the equation:

12 = Expected Medical Expenses - I1
Measure I1 is a measure of the lack of insurance coverage a family has, as it measures the family's expected out-of-pocket payments
for medical care. The interpretation of the coefficients of the demand
model estimated with I1 are therefore counter to that of the other
demand models in most instances.
I1 is correlated positively with the perceived health status of
the family, as is 12. Those who perceive their health to be worse
demand more health insurance. The estimated coefficient for age is
statistically significant in both equations. As the age of the head of
household increases, the expected out-of-pocket payments for medical
care increase. In the 12 equation the relationship is positive, indicating that the expected insurance benefits increase as the age of the
family head increases. The marital status variable is positive and
statistically significant in the I1 and 12 equations.
The group characteristic variables are both negative and both
significant in the I1 equation. In the 12 equation they are both positive and both significant. The group characteristic variables of both
equations provide strong evidence that the depth of insurance coverage increases with group size and with the share of the premium
paid by the employer.
The remaining two demand equations, 13 and IS, have low R2
values for medical expense insurance demand equations. These measures theoretically are not superior to those previously discussed, and
they do not have superior explanatory power empirically.

4 Conclusion
Several different measures of insurance have been used by
researchers in previous studies of medical insurance demand to quan-
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tify a family's level of insurance coverage. This paper compares five
different measures of insurance coverage using the National Medical
Care Expenditure Survey data.
Insurance demand equations using the different measures of insurance as the dependent variable differ significantly from one another.
The 12 equation ranks first in terms of variation explained by traditional medical insurance demand variables. Insurance demand equations utilizing measures 13 and IS rank lowest. Explanatory variables
found to be significantly related to insurance consumption in several
of the equations include age, sex of the head of household, family
size, income, perceived health status, and marital status.1 1
The information on health insurance demand provided by this
research shows that the amount of health insurance persons desire
varies greatly depending on demographic characteristics such as age,
sex, and marital status. Income and the health of the family, proxied by predicted medical expenses, are also important determinants
of the amount of insurance a family purchases. Although the leading
proposals for health care reform call for community rating and universal coverage, there will likely be a sizable market for supplemental insurance after reform. This study provides valuable information
on those groups that have a high demand for health insurance. In a
postreform environment, the same groups likely will have the greatest demand for supplemental health insurance.
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Discussion of Mark J. Browne's "The Definition of
Insurance: Implications for a Health Insurance
Demand Model"
Charles Fuhrer*

I would like to thank Professor Mark Browne for this contribution
to the actuarial literature. To the best of my knowledge, actuaries
have not written on the subject of his paper.
I propose alternative measures of the amount of insurance to the
author's Il, 12, and 13. These are:

Il =

l
I

12

=

J=1

J

N

=l

~ E[Bij]
I

13

N

~ E[OOPd

J=1

I1

where i ranges over all insured for all insurance policies. The author
selected his definitions of measures of insurance from the literature
and, of course, is free to define them in any way he desires. I believe
my measures would be more useful, particularly for the purpose of the
paper.
My measures correspond to what would be the normal way of
ordering policies. For example, suppose two policies A and B were
identical except that they had $100 and $200 deductibles, respectively. For my measure, A would provide more insurance than B. This
* Charles S. Fuhrer, FSA (1977) of the Washington National Insurance Co. in
Lincolnshire, IL has been a group insurance actuary since 1973. He is co-editor of
Actuarial Research Clearing House and has given numerous presentations at actuarial
meetings. Mr. Fuhrer has written many papers and has been awarded the 1988
Practitioner's Prize by the AERF and the 1991 Health Section Research Papers Prize.
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is the normal result because A often pays more benefits than Band
never pays less. Under the author's definitions, if A were purchased
by a healthier insurance than B, then A might have a lower value of
12. Generally, I would expect that a measure of the coverage level of
an insurance policy would be independent of the individual that
chooses to purchase it.
The author tries to answer whether certain factors influence the
purchase of different amounts of insurance. Some of these factors are
correlated directly with the demand for health care. Because his
measures of the amount of insurance are affected by the demand for
health care, correlations exist. An interesting question is: "Do individuals who will have a greater demand for health care services
recognize this fact and then purchase insurance policies with greater
reimbursement provisions?" I believe that the author fails to answer
this question.

Charles Fuhrer
Washington National Insurance Co.
300 Tower Parkway
Lincolnshire, IL 60069-3665

Author's Reply to Discussion
The comments of Mr. Charles S. Fuhrer are greatly appreciated.
His suggestion of several alternative measures of insurance is valuable. A primary aim of my paper was to raise the question of how to
determine the amount of coverage an insured has. While my paper
proposes several measures, future researchers may want to consider
the merits of others as well.
Fuhrer's measures of an insurance policy are "independent of the
individual that choose to purchase it." Such measures of insurance
emphasize the contractual provisions of a policy while failing to
account precisely for the amou,nt of risk transferred by the policy.
Little information on the economic value of an insurance policy to an
individual insured can be gained from such measures. The measures,
however, may be valuable for an insurer when examining a complete
book of business.
The question raised by Mr. Fuhrer, of whether individuals who
are higher risks purchase insurance policies with greater reimbursement provisions, is beyond the scope of the current study. This question has been addressed in three prior studies. Interested readers are
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referred to Browne (1992), Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993), and
Browne and Doerpinghaus (1994).
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On the Equivalence of the Loss Ratio and Pure
Premium Methods of Determining Property and
Casualty Rating Relativities
Robert L. Brown*

Abstract
There are two distinct stages in the property and casualty ratemaking process.
First, there is the portfolio average rate change. Second, there is the adjustment of
classification relativities. It is well known that the loss ratio and pure premium (also
called the loss cost) methods are algebraically equivalent in the stage called the portfolio average rate change. This paper reviews the proof of this equivalence. Further,
it is proved algebraically that the loss ratio and pure premium methods are also
equivalent in calculating classification relativities (or differentials) if certain data
requirements can be met. A short numerical example of this equivalence is included.
Key words: loss cost, ratemaking, relativities

1 Introduction
In property and casualty ratemaking, there are two distinct steps
in the process:
a) The portfolio average rate change.
b) A change in classification relativities.
One is able to use either a loss ratio approach or a pure premium
(or loss cost) approach in these two distinct ratemaking stages. This
paper first reviews the well-documented fact that the loss ratio and
the pure premium approaches are algebraically equivalent when
portfolio average rate changes are being calculated. The paper then
Robert L. Brown, FCIA, FSA, ACAS, is professor of statistics and actuarial science
and director of the Institute of Insurance and Pension Research at the University of
Waterloo. He is a past president of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries and is currently on the Society of Actuaries' Board of Governors and Executive Committee. He is
also an elected Councilor in the City of Waterloo. Professor Brown has authored
several articles and books.
*
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proves that these methods are also equivalent when changes in classification relativities (differentials) are being calculated. 1 For these
methods to be applied, the data must be in the appropriate form.

2 The Portfolio Average Rate Change
The process to be followed in developing the portfolio average
rate change (also known as the statewide or provincewide rate change)
is well known (see Brown, 1993, pp. 70-77) and will not be discussed
directly here. There are two methods that can be used to develop
rates: the loss ratio method and the pure premium method. It is relatively easy to provide mathematical formulas for these methods and
to show algebraically that they are mathematically equivalent. The
proof of their equivalence is well known; see, for example, Stern
(1965, p. 182) and McClenahan (1990). For convenience, the proof will
be repeated here. To this end, the following definitions are needed:
Lijk
Eijk
CR"k
'1
i, j, k
PLR

ILR
NAR
CAR

Dollars of incurred losses for rate cell (i, j, k);
Units of earned exposure for rate cell (i, j, k);
= Current manual rate for rate cell (i, j, k);
Rating variable indicators such as i classes, j territories
(There can be any number of such variables.);
Permissible loss ratio = 1 - expense ratio;
= Indicated loss ratio;
New average rate;
Current average rate.

It now will be proven that the new average rate is the same for the

pure premium method and the loss ratio method.

2.1 Pure Premium Method
The new average rate is determined under the pure premium
method as:
1:
"k L"Ilk
NAR = lE'
"k Ijk

x

1
PLR'

'1

1

Throughout this paper, the terms relativities and dIfferentials are used interchangeably.

98

Vol. 1, No.2, 1993

Journal of Actuarial Practice

2.2 Loss Ratio Method
Under the loss ratio method, the new average rate is given by:
NAR

= CAR x

ILR
PLR .

But the current average rate is determined as
CAR

I; CRijk x Eijk

= '-J.!.l/k'--_ _ __
Eijk
I;k
lJ

and the indicated loss ratio is:
ILR

Dollars of incurred losses

= Dollars of earned premium at current rate level

= 1:

ijk

1:L"k
"k lJ
II

CRiJ'k x EiJ"k .

Thus, the new average rate is:
1:L"k
"k lJ
II

NAR

=

-1Lijk

~x

I;k Eijk
lJ

1

x PLR

1
PLR

which is the same as the new average rate derived by the pure premium method.

3 Change in Classification Relativities
Again, there are two methods that can be used to change classification relativities: the pure premium (or loss cost) method and the
loss ratio method. Some confusion exists, however, about which
method is better and why. Also, the classical ratemaking papers
found in the Casualty Actuarial Society's associateship syllabus may
not make clear what data must be used to guarantee a correct analysis.
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For example, Stern (1965, p. 170) states in the section on classification relativities:
The pure premium indices above measure the relationship of the
loss cost per car for each class to the base class. Consequently,
they also indicate how the rate for each class should relate to
the rate for the base class, if it is accepted that the expense portion of the rate is obtained by a umform expense foading ...
However, pure premiums obtained from a consolidation of widely
divergent bodies of experience must be used with great caution
since they may contain distortions. The above model may contain
in Class 11 a proportionally larger share of experience coming
from low loss cost territories than is contained in the experience
for Class 12. Consequently, a part of the indicated rate aifferential is purely due to distribution; this distortion due to distribution would have to be corrected for, prior to accepting pure
premium indices as true indications of c1assification relativities.
Stern (1965) continues:
There are, however, many advantages in favor of using collected
loss ratios. These loss ratios can be obtained with relative ease
directly from the experience; unlike pure premiums, they are less
likely to be distorted by the influence of divergent distributions,
since the premiums reflect the different rate and loss levels of
the component territories; and finally, loss ratios based on the
actual experience have an air of reality, reflecting the over-all
underwriting record for each class.
Finger (1990, Chapter 5, p. 259) states:
When earned premium is used, the method is usually a "loss
ratio" method; when earned exposures are used, the method is
usually a "pure premium" approach. The loss ratio method can
produce equivalent results if "earned premiums at current rates"
are calculated.
Finger (1990) adds:
There are advantages and disadvantages of using the loss ratio
and pure premium methods. The loss ratio method may be applicable when there is less detailed data available or when tbere
are many different sets of relativities; earned premiums will
reflect the various charges made for different classes, territories,
and coverages. If earnea premiums correspond to historical rate
levels, however, it may be difficult to make adjustments for
intervening changes in rate relativities. The pure premium
approach is usually more accurate, because it requires more information. It also has the advantage of producing frequency and
severity relativities, as well as pure premium relativities; the
loss ratio method only produces loss ratio and severity relativi-
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ties. Severity relativities, however, will not be meaningful if the
underl)'ing coverage is not consistent (e.g., there are differing
deductibles or insured limits).
Finger then provides an arithmetic illustration of an actual calculation of some classification relativities using both the loss ratio
and pure premium techniques. In his solved example using the pure
premium method, Finger does not use just earned exposures for the
denominator of each respective loss cost. Rather, he calculates and
uses what he calls base exposures. He explains base exposures (p. 266):
It should be noted that "base exposures" are used in this exhibit
in place of earned exposures. "Base exposures" are calculated
using the current rate relativities for all relevant rating variables.

Finger argues that the reason for using base exposures instead of
actual exposures is to correct for varying exposure levels in the nonreviewed relativities. For example, Territory A and Territory B may
differ in the distribution of insureds by class.
Finger corrects for the distortion caused by the heterogeneity of
exposure distributions across the variables not now under review, as
previously alluded to in Stern's paper (e.g., varying exposure levels
by class in the different territories) and for which Stern suggests corrections must be made. This is illustrated in the example in section 5
below.
Finger provides a one line arithmetic illustration of how the base
exposure adjustment is made. It is difficult to conclude, however, that
an average reader could reproduce the solution with only the information available.
Some questions remain: Which is superior, the loss ratio method
or the pure premium method? What does Finger mean when he says
that "The loss ratio method can produce equivalent results if 'earned
premiums at current rates' are calculated?" Unfortunately, Finger
does not elaborate further on this comment.
To deal with these questions, an algebraic description of this
aspect of the ratemaking process must be developed. Without loss of
generality, consideration is limited to cases where there are only two
classification parameters. Define two vectors of differentials:
Xi

for i = 1, 2, ... , n (e.g., class)

Yj

for j

= 1, 2, ... , m (e.g., territory)
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Assume there is a base cell, B, for any variable, such that for
that cell:
XB

= YB = 1.000

The current rate for the base cell will be denoted CRB. Otherwise,
the notation used is as defined previously.
Consider a rate manual produced by the base rate CR B and the
two vectors of relativities Xi and Yj. This produces a matrix of m x n
rates. Consider (without loss of generality) that the new differential
for class k, Xk is to be calculated. One can think of class (or territory)
k as occupying the kth row of our rate manual matrix.
The calculations that follow assume that the various rate relativities are calculated independently (as opposed to interactively, as
in Brown's (1988) minimum bias approach) and applied multiplicatively. While the latter assumption is not essential in practice (Le.,
additive differentials are possible), multiplicative differentials are
the norm. The algebraic proofs that follow assume a multiplicative
relationship. The proofs also assume that all expenses are expressed
as a percentage of the gross premium (i.e., there are no flat-loaded
expenses). This means that the loss relativities and rate relativities
are the same.
The papers by Stern and Finger indicate that the calculation of
multiplicative rating relativities can be expressed algebraically as
follows:

3.1 Pure Premium Method
The loss cost for variable k, LCkt adjusted for heterogeneity under
the pure premium method is :

The loss cost for the base cell, B, adjusted for heterogeneity under
the pure premium method is denoted by LCB where:
:EL
. B]·
LC B = ~E
.
.
J

Bj Yj

Thus, the new differential is:
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new

Xk

3.2 Loss Ratio Method
The loss ratio for variable k , LRb is determined as:

The loss ratio for the base cell, B is:
~LBj

LRB

= L~
. CR .'
. BJ
BJ
]

Thus, the adjustment factor for cell k, AFk, is:

and the new differential is determined as:

and XB

= 1. Therefore
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New
X k

Thus it can be seen that when the correct data are used, the pure
premium method and the loss ratio method are algebraically equivalent.

4 Comments
Now that we have proved algebraically the equivalency of the
loss ratio and the pure premium methods in the entire ratemaking
process (Le., both the overall rate change and also the change in relativities) if the appropriate data are used, a number of issues surrounding the calculation of risk classification relativities disappear
or are resolved.
First, if the data requirements can be satisfied, then the loss
ratio method and the pure premium method provide equivalent
results. Therefore, there should be no need to discuss the advantages
of one method over the other. They are equivalent given the appropriate data are available and used. To the extent that one cannot
attain the data requirements, then one can see clearly what inadequacies will result because of the particular data one often is forced
to use.
For example, if in the loss ratio approach one uses collected
earned premiums (or collected loss ratios, as Stern suggests, because
they are readily available), this will result in an error to the extent
that the collected earned premiums are not equal to earned premiums
at the current rate level. If there have been some sizable changes in
relativities in recent rate changes, then this will be a problem. If the
relativities have not changed drastically over the last few rate
changes, however, then there may not be much of a difference
between collected earned premiums and earned premiums at current
rate levels. (Note that overall rate changes are not of any consequence at this stage; only the changes in classification relativities
matter.)
Also, this algebraic illustration shows exactly what is meant by
Finger's base exposures. These are effective exposure units that are
adjusted because of the heterogeneity of exposure distributions across
the different rating parameters. The following illustration makes
this clear.
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5 Illustration
Given the following information, and assuming the revised rates
take effect July 1, 1993 for one year on one year policies, determine
new rates for each of Class 1 and Class 2 and for each of Territory 1
and Territory 2. (Class differentials will not change.) Use both the
loss ratio and pure premium methods. The permissible loss ratio is
0.600, and all data are fully credible.
Territory 1

Territory 2

Present Rates:
Class 1 (Relativity)
Class 2 (Relativity)

100 (1.00)
300(3.00)

200 (2.00)
600 (6.00)

Collected Earned Premium

1,000,000

1,000,000

Policy Year 1991 Incurred Losses

360,000

240,000

Expected Effective Period Incurred
Losses (Trended and Developed)

612,000

408,000

5,000
1,000

2,000
500

Earned Exposure Units:
Class 1
Class 2

The solution is given below for the loss ratio and pure premium
methods. For each of the two methods, the rate change involves
three stages: overall average rate change, change in relativities, and
balance back.

5.1 Loss Ratio Method
5.1.1 Overall Average Rate Change
For the loss ratio method, the actuary must calculate the earned
premium at current rates. The accounting entry for collected earned
premium is not the correct denominator, because it could contain
earned premiums based on the rates in out-of-date rate manuals.
The earned premium at current rates is calculated as

= (100)(5,000)

+ (300)(1,000) + (200)(2,000) + (600)(500)

= 1,500,000.
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This produces an expected effective period loss ratio at current
rates of:
1,020,000

= 1,500,000 = 0.680,
which, with a permissible loss ratio of 0.600, leads to an indicated
rate change of
0.680

= 0.600 - 1 = + 13.3 percent.
5.1.2 Change in Relativities
The given data allow for a territorial relativity change analysis
but not a class relativity change analysis because loss data by class
are not given. We are told that class relativities will remain the
same and are asked to determine the indicated new relativities for
Territories 1 and 2.
For Territory 1 the earned premium at current rates equals:
(100)(5000) + (300)(1000)

= 800,000

For Territory 2 the earned premium at current rates equals:
(200)(2000) + (600)(500)
Territory

2

Existing
Differential

= 700,000
Loss Ratio at
Current Rates

Indicated
Differential

1.00

:::=0.4500

1.0000

2.00

240,000 _ 0 3429
700,000 - .

g:~ (2.00) = 1.5238

Note that as presented, the Territory 1 relativity has been left
at 1.00, whereas the Territory 2 relativity has been reduced from 2.00
to 1.5238. This suggests that the actuary could define the new rates
as follows:
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Territory 1

Territory 2

113.33

172.70
518.09

340.00

If this were done, however, the resulting rate increase would be less
than the required +13.3 percent due to the off-balance created by the
method used to change relativities. This is adjusted in the balanceback step.

5.1.3 Balance Back
The existing average differential is equal to:
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(2) + (500)(6) _ 17647
8,500
-.
.
The proposed average differential is equal to:
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(1.5238) + (500)(4.5714)
= 1.5686.
8,500
The balance-back factor is calculated as:
Existing average differential _ 1.7647 _ 11250
Proposed average differential - 1.5686 - .
,
leading to the following proposed rates:

Class 1
Class 2

Territory 1

Territory 2

127.50
382.50

194.28
582.85

These proposed rates will result in a 13.3 percent increase in premium
income, as required.

5.2 Pure Premium
5.2.1 Overall Average Rate Change
We know that the expected effective period incurred losses
(developed and trended) equal 1,020,000, from which we find the
indicated loss cost:
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_ 1,020,000 _ 120
- 8,500 and the average rate:
=

120
PLR

120

= 0.600 = 200.00.

Note that this is the indicated average gross rate. It is not the indicated rate for any particular territory or class that will be determined when we know the new average relativity for the expected
book of business.

5.2.2 Change in Relativities
To set the new territorial relativities, the actuary normally calculates the average loss costs for Territory 1 and Territory 2 and compares them as follows:
Territory

2

Existing
Relativity

Loss Cost
per Unit

Indicated
Relativity

1.00

f~=60

tOO

2.00

240,000 _ 96
2,500 -

1.60

This is not the same answer as we got from the loss ratio method.
Remember that the pure premium method will be correct only if the
heterogeneity of distributions of exposure units is accounted for.
Recall the following earned exposure unit data:

Class 1
Class 2

Territory 1

Territory 2

5,000
1,000

2,000
500

In Territory I, 5/6 of drivers are Class 1 and 1/6 are Class 2. In
Territory 2, 4/5 of drivers are Class 1 and 1/5 are Class 2. To arrive
at the correct answer, this heterogeneity of cross-variable distributions must be reflected. One way to accomplish this is to use exposure
units that are weighted by their cross-parameter relativities. That
is, Class 1 will count as an exposure unit with weight 1.00, but Class

108

Journal of Actuarial Practice

Vol. 1, No.2, 1993

2 will count as an exposure unit with weight 3.00, because of its class
relativity of 3.00. This leads to the following results:

Territory

Existing
Relativity

2

Weighted
Units of
Exposure

Loss Cost per
Weighted Unit
of Exposure

Indicated
Relativity

1.00

8000

~~=45.00

1.00,

2.00

3500

2~~=68.57

1.5238

5.2.3 Balance Back
Finally, the actuary determines the rate for Territory 1 and Class
1 that will produce all of the correct manual rates by balancing back
for the average indicated relativity. That is:
Average rate
Base rate = A verage re 1ahvlty
. .
where the average rate is 200 and the average relativity is
(5,000)(1) + (1,000)(3) + (2,000)(1.5238) + (500)(4.5714)
8,500

= 1.5686.

This leads to
200
Base rate = 1.5686 = 127.50.
The resulting manual rates are the same as with the loss ratio
method, as expected. This gives us indicated rates where all calculations are based on existing relativities in the current rate manual and
should be treated as a first iteration indicated relativity. These
indicated relativities will be used in a second iteration (for example,
to recalculate the premium at current rate levels in the loss ratio
method) to arrive at a second iteration indication. This process soon
converges to the final relativities.
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Funding Methods and Pension Plan Amendments
Keith P. Sharp*

Abstract**
This paper considers the treatment of plan amendments under the individual
entry age normal and projected unit credit methods. Alternative treatments are considered, and comments are made about their acceptability.
Key words: nometroaetive amendment, normal cost, entry age normal, projected unit credit

1 Introduction
It is common for a pension plan to be amended to improve benefits
in respect of service after the date of amendment. This will be
referred to as a nonretroactive amendment. The application of the
entry age normal and projected unit credit cost methods to this situation requires that a decision be made about the way to handle such
an amendment. This paper considers these two cost methods and their
application to such an amendment. A retroactive improvement can be
treated in a more straightforward manner and is not considered in
this paper.
The discussion of the entry age normal method is relevant to
funding calculations under the Pensions Benefits Acts in Canada and
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
and Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Regulation Section 1.412 in the
United States. The discussion of the projected unit credit method is
relevant to funding calculations and pension expense calculations.
Before developing the main results of this paper, it is important
to introduce the notation used in the sequel. As there is no internationally accepted standard pension notation, we will follow, to a
large extent, the notation used by Anderson (1992).
* Keith Sharp is an associate professor in the department of statistics and actuarial
science at the University of Waterloo. He is a fellow of the Society of Actuaries and
has a Ph.D. in finance.

** The author thanks anonymous referees for helpful comments and the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada for financial support.
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SXj

Funding Methods and Pension Plan Amendments

Label of an individual member of the plan;
Normal cost for individual j at time t, paid at the beginning of each year and expressed in dollars;
Age on the first valuation date coinciding with or next
following the date of participation assuming current participation requirements always had been in effect;
Age from which credited pensionable service is calculated, i.e., the entry age for individual j that determines
the start of the period to which the benefit formula
applies. In some cases the individual may join the plan
after age Wj and be given retroactive pensionable service;
Age at time t of individual j;
Retirement age of individual j;
= Projected annual pension benefit of individual j from
retirement at age Yj;
Projected measure of final pay for individual j; and
Salary scale for individual j at age Xj.

2 Plan Amendments Under Individual Entry Age Normal
2.1 Individual Entry Age Normal
The individual entry age normal pension cost method is used in
both the United States and Canada. There are two common forms of
the method (Anderson, 1992, pp. 13-19; Trowbridge and Farr, 1976, pp.
47-54; and Berin, 1989, p. 14). Under one form, the normal cost is
expressed as a level dollar annual amount. This method is alternatively known as the projected benefit cost method (with supplemental
liability, constant amount) (Winklevoss, 1977), the entry age actuarial
cost method, and the level dollar cost method (entry age, with
supplemental liability) (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p. 27). Under another
form, the normal cost is expressed as a level percentage of salary.
The latter method also is known as the projected benefit cost method
(with supplemental liability, constant percentage) (Winklevoss, 1977),
the entry age actuarial cost method, and the level percentage cost method
(entry age, with supplemental liability), (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p.
327).
Under the individual entry age normal method, the normal cost
is found by taking an equation of value. The equation usually is taken
on the first valuation date coinciding with or next following a member's participation date, assuming current participation requirements
always had been in effect. This age could be that at a date before
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plan inception. The normal cost under the level dollar method, equation (I), is given from this equation of value by dividing both sides of
the equation by the service-based annuity (Anderson, 1992, p. 13):
.

..(12)

= BJ(Yj) ay

J

~

0

Vj

1

x .. -:-:--:l
aV( Yj-Vj I
(1)

Under the level percentage of salary method (Anderson, 1992, p. 18),
the annuity in the denominator of equation (1) takes the salary scale
into account. The dollar normal cost is found by multiplying by the
ratio of the salary scale factors:
(2)

The focus of this paper is the choice of a cost method variant
that is acceptable and makes sense to a client on a plan amendment;
this amounts to a discussion about the method of calculating BNy/
For simplicity it is assumed that all retirements occur at age Yj and
that the only benefit is a retirement annuity.

2.2 Plan Amendment
We focus attention on BNYj). For the purpose of illustration, we
will assume that the benefit is a fraction ra (e.g., ra = 0.01 or 0.02) of
a projected measure Sf of final pay for each year of credited pensionable service. The measure Sf will depend on the plan document definition of the pension benefit; Sf may be, for example, the average of
the earnings in the final three years of service. Thus, prior (subscript
p) to any possible plan amendments, we have:
(3)

From equations (1) and (2) we can see that two persons with the
same entry age wand the same retirement age Y will have the same
normal cost as a fraction of the measure of final salary.
Now consider a situation where at a certain date, the benefit
fraction ra is changed nonretroactively from ra to rl. Usually rl will
exceed ra, although the funding methods discussed here apply math-
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ematically, if not in the view of regulators, also to the case where ro
exceeds rl. One method is to spread the funding of the increase over
the period from amendment to retirement, with no change in the
amendment date actuarial liability; this is the individual level
premium method as described by Anderson (1992, p. 25). Two of the
possible methods of handling this situation under entry age normal
are described below.

2.3 Variant 1: EAN Total Service Spread
For an individual j with pensionable service credited from age Wj
and age at plan amendment Xj' one initially might assume that the
projected benefit should be given by:

(4)
w here the subscript A indicates that the situation after the plan
amendment is being considered and tA is the date of the amendment.
This indicates that the normal cost for individual j, by equation (1)
and (2), would increase under this EAN-total service spread method
in the ratio

EANNC~l
EANNd
P

[ro(x/lA) - wi) + rl(Yi - X/lA))]
ro(Y - Wj)

(5)

This ratio depends on the values of X/tA) and Wj. For example, for
two members i and k with the same pensionable service commencement dates (Wi = Wk) but differing ages at amendment (X/tA) :;t: Xk(tA),)
the normal cost as a fraction of salary no longer will be the same as
the fraction of the measure of final salary. Also, the increase in the
normal cost is not the same ratio rl/rO as the increase in the benefit
accumulation rate.
It is instructive also to consider the effect on the actuarial liability AL. At age x/l) prior to the plan amendment, the actuarial liability is the difference between the present values of future benefits
and future normal costs:
j
j
EAN AL (x-(t)) - PVFB - EANPVFNd (x·(t))
Pi
P
Pi'

(6)

Immediately after the plan amendment at age X/tA) we have (noting
that the future benefits should be those actually projected to be paid
for both the constant dollar and constant percentage methods):
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EANAL~(XPA)) = PVFB~l(XPA)) - EANPVFNC~l(XPA))
[rO(xi(tA) - wi) + rl(Yj - X/tA))]
ro(y - Wj)

x

(PVF~(X/tA)) - EANPVFNC~(xitA)))

Thus, the plan actuarial liability at the date of the amendment
increases because of the amendment, although the benefit rate change
is not retroactive. The proportionate increase in the actuarial liability equals the proportionate increase in the projected benefit. This
aspect may be difficult to explain to a client who is not an actuary.
The increase in accrued liability results because the normal cost
increases only by the same proportionate amount as the increase in
projected benefit. If rl < ro then the accrued liability is reduced,
which may be unacceptable to regulators.

2.4 Variant 2: EAN Retroactive NC Mimic
An alternative method of handling normal costs under a plan
amendment is described in this section. It is used by some pension consultants and gives results that are more acceptable than those
described in the previous section.
Under variant 2 (EAN retroactive NC mimic), the hypothetical
projected benefit is used in calculating the normal cost under this version of the entry age normal cost method. It is that projected benefit
that would be applicable if the amended benefit rate were applied
to all service:
(8)

Under this variant, the normal cost at any post-amendment time t for
individual j increases under both the level dollar and level percentage methods in the ratio of the benefit rates.
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NC~2(t) r1 (Yj =
NC~(t) ro (Yj -

Wj) _ r1
ro

(9)

Wj) -

Under the individual entry age normal method the normal cost is not
interpreted as being the cost of the benefit accrual for the year.
Nonetheless, a proportional increase in normal cost equal to the proportional increase in benefit rates is likely to be intuitively appealing to the client.
Let us now consider the actuarial liability under variant 2.
Immediately after the plan amendment, variant 2 is given for both
the level dollar and level percentage methods by:

Because the actual future benefits are the same for variants 1 and 2,
PVFB~1(XjCtA» =: PVFB'A2(XjCtA». Then we note that PVFB~1(XjCtA» is
related to PVFB~(X/fA» by the proportionate increase in the projected
benefit. Also, the future normal cost increases in the ratio rJlro.
Hence:
EANAL~2(X/tA»
= [ro(X;CtA) - Wj) + r1 (Yj - X/tA» lnVFB j (x.(t »
ro(Y - Wj)
P J A

r-

(11)

.
(r
r)
= EANAL' (X·(tA» + 1- a
P J
ro

.

x PVFB'P(X·(tA»
x
,
(12)
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Appendix A shows that if rl > ro and if sD z is a decreasing function of
Z, then:
(13)
For rl < ro, the actuarial liability is reduced by the amendment.
The last term of equation (11) is likely to be small; the actuarial
liability is changed little by the nonretroactive amendment. This is
likely to make sense to a client.
In the United States, IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2)
requires "If each actuarial assumption is exactly realized under a
reasonable funding method, no experience gains or losses are prod uced." This condition is satisfied by variant 2, as indicated in
Appendix B.

2.5 Variant 3: EAN/ILP
A third method of handling the plan amendment under entry age
normal is to use the individual level premium (ILP) method. This
usually is regarded as a cost method in its own right; here it will be
regarded more as a variant of entry age normal. The terminology
EANjILP will be used.
Under variant 3, the nonretroactive benefit increase at tA is
funded over the period from Xj (t A) to Yj- Hence the normal cost after
the amendment is given by:

(14)

and the actuarial liability at an age x/t), t;::: tA is
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(15)
Immediately following the amendment, the actuarial liability is
found by substituting t = tA in equation (15):

EANAL~3(XjUA)) = PVFB~(XjCtA)) - PVFNC~(XjCtA))

= EANAL~(XjCtA))'

(16)

Thus, as is arranged by construction of variant 3, the actuarial
liability at the time of the amendment is unchanged by the amendment. Considering equations (9) and (13), it is evident that the normal cost under variant 3 must increase at the amendment by more
than the ratio by which it increases for variant 2 for fl > fa :

EANNC~3(X/tA))

(17)

EANNdp(X·(tA))
]

This behavior compares with the fl/fO proportionate increase in
normal cost under equation (9) (variant 2, the EAN retroactive NC
mimic). Which is more acceptable may depend on the perceived relative importance of the behavior of the normal cost and of the actuarial liability.

3 Plan Amendments Under Projected Unit Credit
3.1 Projected Unit Credit
The projected unit credit method commonly is used, partly because
the accounting bodies of both Canada and the United States require
that it be used in calculating the pension expense to be entered in the
employer's financial statements (CICA,l 1986, Section 3460.28;

1 CICA refers to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
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FASB,21990; SFAS3 87, paragraph 40 and SFAS 106). Partly as a
result, most Canadian and United States pension plans are valued for
funding purposes using this method. The method is described under
the names projected unit credit (Anderson, 1992, p. 152; Berin, 1989, p.
119), prorate accrued benefit (Trowbridge and Farr, 1976, p. 40), accrued
benefit cost method (constant amount) (Winklevoss, 1977, p. 78), or
projected accrued benefit cost method (McGill and Grubbs, 1989, p. 291).
Under the service prorate version of the projected unit credit
method, the projected retirement age pension is allocated pro rata
over years of pensionable service. Thus, BNx/t)) is based on pay projected to retirement and service accrued to age Xj. The normal cost is
the present value of the current year's benefit allocation. The actuarial liability is the present value of the benefit allocated to the date
of valuation at which the age is Xj nearest BNxjY. It is assumed that
the date of valuation corresponds to the beginning of a plan year.
Hence, the normal cost for the plan year for individual j is given by:
(18)
and the actuarial liability by:
PUCALNt) = Bj(x-(t))
]

ii~12)
J

DYi .
Dx.(t)

(19)

J

3.2 Plan Amendment
Prior to the plan amendment at tA but at the attained age X/tA)
of individual j at the time of the valuation we have:
(20)
Again consider a nonretroactive increase at age X/tA) of the benefit
fraction from ra to rl. Two possible methods of handling this situation
are described next.

2 FASB refers to the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
3 SFAS refers to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards.
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3.3 Variant 1: PUC Service Weighting
The plan document gives a definition of accrued benefit that may
be used in obeying vesting legislation; this accrued benefit may be
based on the salary at attained age x/t)o
Under variant 1 with rl > ro, we assume instead that the benefit
accrued up to age xP) is given by the fractional method:

The normal cost for the year following age x/t), where t ? tA, would
increase in the ratio:
PUCNc!Al(XjCt))

PUCN~(x/t))

rO(Xj(tA) - Wj) + rl(Yj - Xj(tA))
rO(Yj - Wj)

(22)

This contrasts with the ratio rl / ro, which is more natural if one
regards the benefit as accruing at a rate ro, before the effective date
of the amendment and at a rate rl afterward instead of using the
fractional method.
The accrued liability under the fractional method at age X/tA)
increases, because of the amendment, in the same ratio:
PUC Ar!Al(XjCt))

PUCA~(x/t))

rO(Xj(tA) - Wj) + rl(Yj - X/tA))
rO(Yj - Wj)

(23)

This increase in actuarial liability is somewhat counterintuitive in a
situation where the benefit accrued up to age Xj(tA) can be regarded as
being unchanged.
In the case ro < rl, the normal cost and the actuarial liability are
both decreased by the amendment.

3.4 Variant 2: PUC Accruals Weighting
Under variant 2, the benefit is assumed accrued at a rate ro, for
service before the amendment and rl for service afterward. It thus
differs from variant 2 of the entry age method. Thus:
(24)
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and the actuarial liability is unchanged:
(25)
The normal cost at time t, t etA, increases (or decreases if rO < rl) in
the expected ratio because the variant 2 accrued benefit increases as:

Hence
PUCNc!A2(X/t))
PUCN4(x/t))

B~2(xi(t) + 1) - B~2(x;Ct))
B~(xjU) + 1) - B~(x/t))
(27)

This variant gives results that might be expected by a client. In
the United States, variant 2 usually is required for calculation of
pension expense under SFAS 106 and SFAS 87 (Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 1990, paragraph 40, footnote 8). Paragraph 40 of
SFAS 87 states that" ... pension benefits ordinarily should be based
on the plan's benefit formula to the extent that the formula states or
implies an attribution." Footnote 8 has" ... benefit of 1 percent of
final pay for each year of service up to 20 years and 1.5 percent of
final pay for years of service in excess of 20 ... the attribution ... will
not assign the same amount of pension benefit for each year of service." If the plan document defines the benefit accrual on a fractional
basis, as in equation (21), then variant 1 is acceptable.
In Canada, the requirements are less clear. The Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants (1986, paragraph 3460.28) states
"the cost of pension benefits ... should be determined using the projected benefit method prorated on services."
The United States IRC Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3) discusses the allocation of projected benefits between past and future
years. Example (5) of IRC Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(g) indicates variant 2 (PUC accruals weighting) to be the acceptable
method for funding purposes when the plan document defines the
accrued benefit according to equation (26) rather than according to
the fractional equation (21). This variant also satisfies the zero gain
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condition of IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2), as is shown in
Appendix C.

4 Conclusion
This paper discusses the use of the individual entry age normal
and projected unit credit pension funding methods in the presence of a
nonretroactive increase in the benefit accrual rate. In the case of both
funding methods, it is recommended that the cost method be handled
in such a way that the normal cost increases in the same proportion
as the increase in the benefit accrual rate. Alternative methods are
discussed, however, that may be more acceptable to some actuaries.
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Appendix A-Entry Age Normal, Variant 2 (EAN
Retroactive NC Mimic), Proof of Decrease of Actuarial
Liability at Amendment

and assume that sNx is a decreasing function of x. Then
ji(x + 1) -ji(x)

SN

=

x+l -

sN

y-x-l

1{ _

sN -SN
x
1{

y-x

_ (y - X)SN H l - (y - x -1)(SNHl + SOx) - sN1{
(y - x - 1)(y - x)

SNH l - (y - x -1) sOx - sN1{
(y - x -1)(y - x)

= (SOHl -

SOx) + (SOHZ - SO) + ... + ( s01{_l _SOx)
(y - x - 1)(y - x)

~o

(l.A)

with equality only if sOx = sOz for x + 1
XjCtA), equation (12) gives us

EANA~Z(XPA))

=

~

z

~

y - 1. Because Wj <

EANAL~(XjCtA))
+

(rl - roY PVFB j ( .Ct))
(Yj - XjCtA))
ro
P xl A x sN _ sN
Wj

Yj

using the decreasing nature of j(x) from equation (1.A) and assuming rl
> roo
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Appendix B-Entry Age Normal, Variant 2 (EAN
Retroactive NC Mimic), Proof of Zero Gain
The notation used is
For the whole plan;
The set of actives (see Anderson, 1992, p. 9);
= Gain in year t to t+ 1;
= Valuation interest rate;
Fund value at time t;
Unfunded at time t, UALPL(t) = ALPL(t) - F(t)
Actual contributions in the year t to t+ 1;
= Interest to time t+1 at the assumed rate i on the contributions C(t).

PL
A
G(t)
F(t)
UALPL(t)
CW
JeW

For simplicity, assume that the membership consists only of
actives who will be below retirement age at the end of the year.
Assume that the only benefit is on retirement. Use the standard formula for the gain (see, e.g., Anderson, 1992, p. 20). Assume, following
IRe Regulation Section 1.412(c)(3)-1(c)(2), that "each actuarial
assumption is exactly realized," so that for example
F(t + 1) - (C(t) + Je(t) - F(t))(l + i) = O.

(l.B)

Then the gain in a year t, after the amendment, t ::? tA, is given by
G(t)

= (EANUAL~~(t) + EANNC~~(t))(1 + i) -

PL

= ( EANALA2(t) - F(t)

-

(EANAL~~(t

= F(t

(C(t) + J/t)

PL) (1 + I). - (C(t) + JeW)
+ EA NNCA2(t)

+1) - Fa + 1))

+ 1) - (C(t) + Je(t)) - F(t)(1 + i) +
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-1?ANAL~2(XjU + 1))
1+1

- j EAN[pVFB~2(XP+1))-PVF(EANNC~2(X/t+1)))]
1+1

=

O.

(2.B)

In the above has been used the assumption that decrements,
which reduce At at time t to At+l at time t+1, give At+l as a proportion

of At.
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Appendix C-Projected Unit Credit, Variant 2 (PUC
Accruals Weighting), Proof of Zero Gain
Use notation and assumptions as for Appendix B. Then the gain in
the year starting at time t is given (Anderson, 1992, p. 13) using equation (1.B) by
G(t)

= (pUCUAL~~(t) + PUCNc&~(t))(1
- (C(t)

+ i)

+ iC(t)) - PUCUAL~~(t + 1)

= t-(PUC AriA2 (XjU)) - PUCNC~2(XjU)))(1 +0
1

-

~ PUCAriA2 (XjU +

1))

1+1

=0

where again the set At reduces after a year to At+l at the assumed
proportion (1 - qXj(t»).
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Estimating the Effect of Statutory Changes on
Insured Casualty Losses Using Generalized
Indicator Variables
Ruy A. Cardoso*

Abstract
Techniques for estimating future insured losses in casualty insurance typically
assume consistency in the insurance environment over time. Statutory changes, however,
can create sharp discontinuities in the loss-generating process, complicating the estimation of those losses. Using indicator variables and dummy variables allows for quantification of the effect of such discontinuities. Three examples from private passenger
automobile insurance are presented to illustrate how these variables can be used.
Key words and phrases: dummy variables, linear regression, tort threshold, coverage
stackil1g, coverage trigger, coverage limits

1 Introduction
Estimation of future insured losses in casualty insurance often is
based on an examination of the past patterns of those losses over
time. Usually a linear or exponential relationship between losses and
time is postulated as a starting point. Under this traditional actuarial approach, a further implicit assumption is that the insured losses
are generated by an underlying process that changes smoothly ..
Statutory changes, however, can create discontinuities in the lossgenerating process that must be accounted for properly in estimating
future losses. This paper explains and illustrates a simple method of
accounting for such discontinuities after they have occurred.
Specifically, the method uses generalized forms of the linear regression variables known as indicator (or dummy) variables. Section 2
describes the most common actuarial method of estimating future
losses in the absence of such discontinuities, while Section 3 provides
* Ruy Cardoso, FCAS, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr.
Cardoso previously has held consulting and insurance company positions whose primary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an S.B. in management science.
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some background on indicator variables. Section 4 provides several
specific examples of the generalized indicator variable approach
using Massachusetts private passenger automobile insurance data, and
Section 5 briefly summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
this approach.

2 Traditional Estimation of Future Losses
For simplicity, the discussion below assumes that the quantity of
interest in the estimation procedures is the pure premium or the
average insured loss per unit of insurance exposure. For private passenger automobile insurance, the unit of insurance exposure is generally a car-year, i.e., a single car insured for one year. The two most
common models used to estimate future pure premiums assume either a
linear or an exponential relationship between pure premiums (Y) and
time (T), as shown in equations (1) and (2):

Y = a + bT

(1)

(2)

where a and b are constants (McClenahan, 1990). These two models
often are based on economic indices rather than time and frequently
include adjustments for autocorrelation (Cummins and Derrig, 1993).
For simplicity in explaining the indicator variable approach, the
remainder of this paper focuses on equation (1). Equation (2) sometimes is called log-linear because it can be transformed into equation
(1) by taking logs. Once equation (2) is transformed, indicator variables also can be applied in a manner similar to that in equation (1).
The interpretation of the quantities discussed below, however, would
be different in the transformed case.
In practice, the time variable used in equation (1) is discrete,
most often the accident year (the year in which the accident generating the loss occurred) associated with each loss. Further, the traditional method does not rely on individual losses. It works instead
with aggregate pure premiums, in this case for each accident year.
Thus, equation (1) simply says that pure premiums change by a constant dollar amount per year. Future pure premiums are estimated by
assuming that the estimated annual change will continue into the
future, although practicing actuaries often will modify the equation's
results if its underlying assumptions are too strict.
It is not necessary to attribute the estimated pure premium
change to specific causes, although blind application of the model
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may lead to unreasonable results, especially if the random component
of the loss-generating process is high. Pure premiums are not a direct
(causal) function of the time variable; time is intended as a proxy for
the many unspecified factors that determine pure premiums. This
lack of causal explanation, however, is common to many possible
methods of estimating future pure premiums. For example, one may
use a Box-Jenkins 1 time series model (an approach widely used in nonactuarial settings) to relate the pure premium for a given accident
year to pure premiums for past accident years and/ or to past random
errors, not to any underlying causal variables. The primary reason for
using the time proxy is that, in practice, the number of available
pure premium data points is usually too small to perform meaningful
analyses of causal relationships (or, for that matter, Box-Jenkins
analysis).
Whatever the underlying causal variables are, equation (1)
implicitly assumes that they will behave smoothly over time. When
there is a significant underlying change in the smoothness of the lossgenerating process, the model is likely to produce poor estimates,
making it necessary to deal with such discontinuities in some reasonable way. While the subjective adjustments frequently used in practice (for example, adjustment of data before the change to a
postchange basis) may be appropriate in certain situations, the use of
generalized indicator variables provides a more objective approach.

3 Background on Indicator Variables
An indicator random variable usually is defined with respect to
the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event. Thus, if A is an event and
I(A) is the indicator random variable of A, then
if A occurs
otherwise.
In this paper, A is assumed to be an event (a change in the environment) that affects the pure premium. (See Miller and Wichern (1977)
for a brief discussion of indicator variables in linear regression analysis.) Incorporation of indicator variables into equation (1) produces
the model shown in equation (3):

For a detailed description of the Box-Jenkins time series model and analysis, see Box
and Jenkins (1970). For a brief introductory treatment, however, see Wheelwright and
Makridakis (1985).

1
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Y = a + bT + ~

1=1

(3)

Ci I/Ai)

where m is the number of indicator variables used, Ci, i = 1,2, ... , m
are constants, and Ii is the indicator variable for the ith change. Table
1 illustrates the results of such a model when m = 1, a = $100, b =
$10, c1 = $5, 11 = for T:::; 3, and 11 = 1 for T ;:::: 4. Here A is the event
{T;:::: 4}.

°

TABLE 1
Hypothetical Pure Premium Model

T

y

Change in Pure Premium

Indicator

1

$110
$120
$130
$145
$155
$165

$10
$10
$10
$15
$10
$10

0
0
0
1
1
1

2
3
4

5
6

Under equation (3), the indicator variable can be thought of as an
on-off switch that reflects some change in the environment at and
beyond T = 4. In a sense, a model using such a variable has one foot in
the world of causal explanation.
It is not necessary for an indicator variable to be strictly zero-one,
however. The terms generalized indicator variables and dummy variables are used interchangeably in this paper to reflect more general
forms. Many changes in an environment are more analogous to a dimmer switch than to a simple on-off switch. That is, they occur gradually rather than all at once. McDowall, et al. (1980) describe the use
of generalized indicator variables (or intervention components in their
terminology) in Box-Jenkins time series analysis. The applications
below will illustrate both the zero-one case and more general cases in
the context of linear regressions against time, using statutory changes
affecting private passenger automobile insurance as examples.

4 Specific Applications: Private Passenger Automobile
Insurance
Permanent statutory changes in the insurance environment can
have at least three effects on accident year pure premium data:
a) Single step, reflecting a change that is completely effective in a
specified accident year and all subsequent accident years.
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b) Two step (or, more generally, multiple step), reflecting a change
that is partially effective in a specified accident year and completely effective in all subsequent accident years.
c) Infinite step, reflecting a change that is partially effective in a
specified accident year and increasingly effective in all subsequent accident years, but never completely effective.
The first effect can be modeled using the simple zero-one indicator
variable, the second using an indicator variable that takes values
between zero and one, and the third using an indicator variable that
takes values greater than one.

4.1 The Single Step Case
An example of a single step statutory change in private passenger
automobile insurance is a change in the tort threshold, the level of
injuries that must be sustained before a person injured in an automobile accident can sue for pain and suffering damages. Certain states
have no restrictions on the right to sue (Le., there is no tort threshold), while those states where a no-fault system exists have either a
qualitative threshold (usually referred to as a verbal threshold) or a
monetary threshold (usually measured by medical costs). In the state
of Massachusetts the current tort threshold is a monetary one. That
is, the medical costs of the injuries sustained in an accident must
exceed a fixed dollar amount before a suit for pain and suffering can
be filed. On January I, 1989 this threshold was raised from $500 to
$2,000 for all accidents occurring on or after January I, 1989. It follows
that:
I

= {~ otherwise.

if accident year

~

1989

Table 2 displays the accident year pure premiums for the bodily
injury liability (BIL) coverage for the accident years 1984-1992.
(Losses are limited to basic limits and developed to ultimate values.)
Figure 1 displays the values in graphical form.
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TABLE 2

Ultimate Bil Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year

AccYear

T

1984
1985
1986
1987
1986
1989
1990
1991
1992

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9

Bil Pure Premium

Change in Pure Premium

Indicator

NA
$9.27
$5.42
$9.65
$6.65
($2.99)
$11.22
$15.41
$15.14

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

$71.01
$80.28
$85.70
$95.35
$102.00
$99.01
$110.23
$125.64
$140.78

Figure 1
Ultimate Bil Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year
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As both Table 2 and Figure 1 show, pure premiums rose steadily
over the accident years 1984-1992 except in accident year 1989, the
year in which the tort threshold was raised. As had been expected,
raising the threshold reduces the pure premiums for the bodily injury
liability coverage. An estimate of how much the pure premiums were
reduced can be obtained using linear regression of the pure premiums
against both the accident years and an indicator variable that is
assigned the value of zero in accident years 1984-1988 and the value
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of one in accident years 1989-1992. The regression results are shown in
equation (4).

PP

= 57.39 + 9.83 x T -

12.19

xI

(4)

where PP denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year (with 1984
considered year I), and I denotes the indicator variable. Fitted values according to this equation also are displayed in Figure 1. The
interpretation of equation (4) is that pure premiums are rising at
$9.83 per year and that the change in the tort threshold reduces pure
premiums by $12.19 from what they otherwise would have been
(although the t-statistic for the coefficient of the indicator variable
is not significantly different from zero under the usual significance
levels). Future pure premiums in the presence of the higher tort
threshold can be estimated using the above equation and holding the
indicator variable at its postchange value of one. Naturally, the use
of fewer data points will result in different estimates. This model's
residuals indicate serial correlation of the errors, although the serial
correlation might disappear if the infinite step model described in
Section 4.3 were used. Analysis of residuals, however, is not a topic
for this paper. Equation (4) simply serves to show how a zero-one
indicator variable can be applied.

4.2 The Two-Step Case
Because private passenger automobile insurance policies are written throughout a given calendar year, the policy that covers an accident occurring in a particular accident year may have been written in
that year or in the prior year. A change in the terms of the policy,
therefore, will not affect all accidents occurring in a given year, only
those covered by policies written after the change. In other words, a
policy change will have only a partial effect on the accident year in
which the change is made.
At the same time the tort threshold was raised in Massachusetts,
another pair of statutory changes led to just this effect. A stacking
provision (which determines whether policy limits from multiple
policies in the same household can be combined) and a trigger provision (which determines the conditions under which coverage applies)
were both modified in a way that was expected to reduce pure premiums. These modifications only applied to uninsured/underinsured
motorists (UM/UIM) coverages, which pay for injuries in which a
driver has insufficient bodily injury liability insurance (if any) to
cover an insurance claim arising from an accident he or she caused.

133

The Effects of Statutory Changes

Ruy A. Cardoso

Prior to January I, 1989, households with more than one UM/UIM
policy, under certain circumstances, could combine (stack) the limits
of all of those policies to cover a single accident, in effect multiplying the limit on each policy by the number of policies in the household (if the limits were the same for each policy). This ability to
combine limits was removed for policies written on or after January I,
1989, reducing aggregate losses paid from what they otherwise would
have been.
The change in the trigger provision works as follows. Losses paid
under the UM/UIM coverages were unaffected by the limits of an atfault driver's bodily injury liability insurance until January I, 1989.
Policies written on or after that date, however, only pay losses up to
the difference in limits between the UM/UIM coverage, and the atfault driver's bodily injury liability limits. (That is, an additional
constraint must be satisfied before the coverage is triggered.)
Because of the effective date of these changes, they were only
partially effective in accident year 1989 but completely effective in
all subsequent accident years. Based on the distribution of inception
dates for policies written in Massachusetts, about 65 percent of the
accidents occurring in accident year 1989 were covered by the modified policy.2 Table 3 displays the accident year pure premiums for
the UM/UIM coverages for the accident years 1984-1992. (Losses are
limited to basic limits and developed to ultimate values.) Figure 2
displays the values in graphical form.
TABLE 3
Ultimate UM/UIM Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year

Acc Year

T

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

UM/UIM
Pure Premium

Change in
Pure Premium

$18.91
$23.83
$26.91
$29.40

NA
$4.92

$3.08
$2.49
$4.16
($12.65)
($3.41)
$1.77
$0.93

$33.56
$20.91
$17.50
$19.27
$20.20

Indicator
0
0
0
0
0
0.65
1
1
1

2 The losses paid under the UMjUIM coverages also should have been affected by the
chan!;ie in the tort threshold, but to a far lesser degree than they were affected by the
stacking and trigger changes.
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Figure 2
Ultimate UM/UIM Basic Limits Pure Premiums by Accident Year
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As both Table 3 and Figure 2 show, pure premiums rose steadily
over the accident years 1984-1992 except in accident years 1989 and
1990, the two years over which the modified stacking and trigger
provisions became effective. As expected, the two changes reduce the
pure premiums for the UMjUIM coverages. An estimate of how much
the pure premiums were reduced can be obtained using linear regression of the pure premiums against both the accident years and a generalized indicator variable (dummy variable) I that is assigned the
value of zero in accident years 1984-1988, the value of 0.65 in accident
year 1989, and the value of one in accident years 1990-1992, i.e.,

o
I=

{

if T = I, 2, 3, 4, 5

0.65 if T = 6
1

if T

~

7.

The regression results are shown in equation (5):
PP = 17.14 + 3.13 x T - 23.17 x I
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where PP denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year (with 1984
considered year I), and I denotes the dummy variable. Fitted values
according to this equation also are displayed on Figure 2. The interpretation of equation (5) is that pure premiums are rising at $3.13 per
year and that the stacking and trigger modifications reduce pure
premiums by $23.17 from what they otherwise would have been. As
the indicator variable for accident year 1989 is 0.65, the reduction in
that year was not the full value of $23.17, however; it was instead a
partial value of (0.65 x $23.17) or $15.06. Future pure premiums
under the modified stacking and trigger provisions can be estimated
using the above equation and holding I=1. Again, the use of fewer
data points will result in different estimates. Despite the two step
nature of the discontinuity in this case, the functional form of the
equation is the same as that of equation (4). Both are simply special
cases of the general equation (3).
It is important to note, however, that the two step case described
above also could be modeled using two zero-one indicator variables,
the first changing to one in 1989 and the second changing to one in
1990. While the results of such a model would be similar to the
results produced by equation (5) (due to the close fit), they would
.come at the cost of a degree of freedom and a less apparent model
structure. It is easy to grasp the concept of a partial effect by seeing a
generalized indicator variable with a value of 0.65, and it is clear in
this instance that the 0.65 value has an objective basis rather than
one that only pretends not to steal a degree of freedom.

4.3 The Infinite-Step Case
Certain changes in the insurance environment not only shift the
relationship between pure premiums and time but also change the
slope of the relationship. This type of effect can be modeled using
two generalized indicator variables, the first the usual zero-one type
and the second comprising a series of infinitely increasing values. The
particular change in Massachusetts that can be modeled this way
occurred at the same time as the change in the tort threshold and
was effective for all accidents occurring in accident year 1989 and subsequent years (despite contrary policy language). Specifically, the
coverage limit of the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage
increased from $2,000 to $8,000 on January I, 1989. This coverage pays
for injuries regardless of fault and therefore also is known as no-fault
coverage.
Because many of the claims paid under the PIP coverage reached
the $2,000 limit in the years before the limit was increased, claim
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cost inflation only could affect a subset of all claims. Increasing the
limit to $8,000, however, allows those claims previously constrained
by the limit to reflect the effects of claim cost inflation, in turn
allowing the aggregate pure premiums for the PIP coverage to reflect
inflation more completely and thus increase more quickly (i.e., with
a greater slope). While it is possible that increasing the tort threshold also may have a slope-changing effect on BIL coverage (see
Section 4.1), the PIP limit change serves as a much clearer illustration.
If we denote the slope of the pure premium line under the $2,000
limit as b, the size of the discontinuity created by the statutory
change as Cl, and the slope of the pure premium line under the $8,000
limit as C2 (where c2 is expected to be greater than b), then pure premiums over time can be modeled as follows:
a + bT

pp

for T :::; 5

= a + bT + Cl

for T

=6

for T

~

(6A)

{

a + 6b + cl + c2(T-6)

7.

While this is a natural way to model the PIP pure premiums over
time, equation (6A) does not fit into the general equation (3). In order
to transform equation (6A) into a specific instance of equation (3), it
is necessary to redefine c2 as the difference between the post-1989
slope and the pre-1989 slope (where the difference is expected to be
positive) and adopt the following pair of generalized indicator variables:
if T:::; 5
if T

~

6

and

o
12 = {
(T-6)

if T :::; 6
if T

~

7.

Equation (6A) can be recast as:
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pp

a + bT

for T ::; 5

= a + bT + Cl

for T = 6

(6B)

{

a + bT + cl + c2(T-6)

for T :2 7,

with equation (6B) being a specific instance of equation (3):
(6C)

Table 4 below displays the accident year pure premiums for the
PIP coverage for the accident years 1984 to 1992 (again developed to
ultimate values); Figure 3 displays the values in graphical form.
TABLE 4
Ultimate PIP Pure Premiums by Accident Year
Acc
Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

T
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

PIP Pure
Premium

Change in
Pure Premium

$12.98
$14.97
$15.92
$17.61
$19.63
$36.03
$39.81
$43.39
$48.33

NA
$1.99
$0.95
$1.69
$2.02
$16.40
$3.78
$3.58

Indicator
#1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

$4.94

Indicator
#2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3

As both Table 4 and Figure 3 show, pure premiums rose steadily over
accident years 1984 through 1988, jumped sharply at accident year
1989, and rose more steeply over accident years 1990 though 1992 (as
expected). An estimate of how much the pure premium line was
shifted and steepened because of the change in limit can be obtained
using linear regression of the pure premiums against both the accident
years and the two indicator variables displayed in Table 4 above.
The regression results are shown in equation (7).
PP = 11.44 + 1.59 x T + 14.S1

X

II + 2.45
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where PP again denotes pure premium, T denotes accident year, and II
and 12 denote the indicator variables. Fitted values according to this
equation are displayed on Figure 3. The interpretation of equation (7)
is that pure premiums were rising at $1.59 per year, increased $14.81
as a result of the change in the PIP coverage limit (because 11=1 in
1989), and now are rising at $4.04 per year, where $4.04 equals the
Figure 3
Ultimate PIP Pure Premiums By Accident Year
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prechange slope of $1.59 plus the postchange increment of $2.45 (the
coefficient of 12)' Future pure premiums under the $8,000 PIP coverage
limit can be estimated by using the above equation, holding II
constant at its value of one and moving 12 up one for each year beyond
accident year 1989.
Relative to the single step and two step cases, this case has cost
another degree of freedom. But in this situation an additional quantity is being estimated, specifically the postchange slope, making
the cost an appropriate one to pay. Further, the model structure is
reasonably apparent. While other approaches could be used to model
the infinite step case, the one used here strikes the best balance
between clarity and degrees of freedom.

5 Summary of the Approach
As illustrated above, generalized indicator variables can be used
to model a variety of different time series discontinuities in private
passenger automobile insurance. While the examples above have
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been restricted to permanent statutory changes, the approach can be
extended easily to temporary changes as well as to other lines of
insurance. This flexibility is a key advantage of the approach, as is
its ability to let the data speak for themselves. Alternative
approaches, such as adjusting all data to a postdiscontinuity basis,
can work in the single step case above, but such an alternative is
likely to be more subjective than the generalized indicator variable
approach.
On the other hand, a too-complicated set of indicator variables
could be used to mask the occasional tendency to force a preordained
conclusion. Further, the use of multiple indicator variables easily
could lead to overfitting, especially in the common situation where
only a small number of data points is available. Such pitfalls should
not blind the actuary to the usefulness of the generalized indicator
variable approach. As with any model-building exercise, the value
of indicator variables as a tool will rise with the care taken in using
them.
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Life Insurance Applications of Recursive Formulas
L. Timothy Giles·

AbstracF
This paper discusses several practical applications of recursive formulas:
a)

Traditional whole life-As an introduction, the well-known relationship between
successive terminal reserves is reviewed. Recursive formulas are developed to calculate the reserves and the premiums;

b)

Universal life-Recursive formulas are used both for the calculation of target
premiums and reserves. Consideration is given to the TEFRA corridor;

c)

Paid-up rider-A participating single premium rider that provides a level death
benefit can be devised using an inherent one year term benefit. Recursive functions
are used to determine the premium that precisely matures the rider.

Because the APL programming language is particularly amenable to recursive formulas, a few sample APL programs are provided.
Key words: APL, TEFRA corridor, universal life, paid-up rider

1 Introduction
A recursive formula is one where the current result is generated
from previous results once the starting values are given. Essentially,
a recursive formula is a difference equation with known starting values. Some formulas are special linear difference equations that, when
added, condense to the first and last values of the recursion. Thus, if
the starting value is known (usually zero), the ending value (usually
the maturity amount) and all the intermediate values can be derived
easily.
* 1. Timothy Giles, FSA, MAAA is an actuary at Farm Family Life Insurance
Company, Albany, New York. He began his actuarial career as a summer student at
New York Life Insurance Company while majoring in mathematics at Holy Cross
College. He has worked at six other life insurance companies during his thirty year
career.
This paper is an extension of the author's paper entitled "The Practical Use of
Recursive Functions" that appeared in ARCH, 1993.3.
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Actuaries are familiar with such formulas, especially in the area
of reserve and asset share calculations; see, for example, Jordan
(1991) and Bowers et al. (1986). Shiu (1987) and Seah and Shiu (1987)
elegantly present recursive formulas in their discussions of papers by
Berin and Lofgren (1987) and Eckley (1987), respectively.
My interest in recursive formulas began in 1985 with the problem
of finding the target premium for universal life policies. What level
deposit (along with credited interest and mortality and expense
charges) would mature the policy exactly? At that time I used trial
and error to obtain the target premiums. A much better method, however, later was published by Eckley (1987).2 What these pioneers
discovered is that by defining a transformed mortality rate Q'=Q/(Q
+ I), the traditional commutation functions could be used (with Q'
replacing Q) to calculate premiums and account values directly. These
modified commutation functions are called transformation functions.
When the accumulation formula changes due to the TEFRA3 corridor (if the cash value becomes too high in relation to the death
benefit, a higher minimum death benefit is invoked), however, a different formula for Q' must be used. One, theoretically, could switch
functions at the duration of change. I believe, however, that recursive formulas offer a better solution. Recursive formulas also can be
used to perform the intricate calculation of paid-up riders that fund a
benefit with a combination of one year term and paid-up insurance.

2 Introduction to the Method
Following Shiu (1987), define a first order linear recursive
(difference) equation as
k

= 0, I, 2, ...

(1)

where xo, {akJ, and {bkJ are known. Let
(2)

with So = 1.
Dividing both sides of equation (1) by

Sk+l

yields

2 I am also familiar with a similar (though unpublished) work by Wesley C. Green.
Mr. Green currently is director of Actuarial Systems and MIS at Phoenix Home Life
Mutual Insurance Company in Hartford, CT.
3 Tax

Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982).
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i.e.,
(3)

L1 (::) =

Summing equation (3) from k=D to k=n-1 yields
(4)

Thus, once the starting value Xo is determined, the nth term can be
obtained directly without explicitly computing the intermediate
terms.

3 Traditional Whole Life
Here is the procedure for deriving a recursive formula for a traditional whole life reserve with a death benefit of 1:
a) Establish the succession rule.
You must know precisely the mathematical relationship between
the reserve at t and that at t + 1. For example, for traditional
whole life with face value t, it is well known (see, for example,
Bowers et al., Chapter 7, Section 8) that the succession rule for
the reserves is:
(5)

where P is the net level premium, tV is the net premium terminal
reserve at time t, Qt is the valuation mortality rate at age x+t (x
is the issue age), and i is the valuation interest rate.
b) Cast the succession rule into linear form.
Put equation (5) in linear form (as in equation (I)),

(6)

c)

Compute the compounding element from issue to maturity.
The compounding element Fk, as in equation (2), gives
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Fk+1

=}lk[(l+Oj
(1-Qj)
.

Notice that l/Fk is a discount factor, i.e.,

d) Divide both sides of the succession rule by Ft+l and place the
result in finite difference form as in equation (3).

p

Qt/(1-Qt)

Ft

Ft+1

e) Sum both sides from issue to maturity.
Let m be the number of years from issue to maturity. Note that
mV = 1 and oV = O.

(7)

f)

Solve for P.
From equation (7),

P x

m-1 1
1
m-1 vQt
-= -+
t=O Ft
Fm
t=O Ft

L

where v
follows

L-

= (1 + 0- 1.

Note that equation (8) can be rearranged as

1
mV oV _ P x m-1
)' Fo t"';;b Ft -

Fm -

(8)

m-1 vQt

)'-

t1J Ft

which essentially states that
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Maturity value - Issue value

= Premiums -

Claims,

with all terms discounted to issue.
g) Generate the intermediate values from the succession rule and
the premium.
From equation (4), it follows that
t-l P - VQk

tV = Ft x)'

(;:0

F

k

.

Notice that we have discounted all terms to issue, then accumulated.

4 Universal Life
This demonstration assumes a level death benefit of 1. The actuarial starting point for universal life mathematics is equation (5),
the formula connecting successive terminal reserves for conventional
whole life insurance:

Here 1 - t+l V is called the net amount at risk, and Qt x (1 - t+l V) is
called the mortality charge.
Three sources of difficulties have to be overcome:
a) The mortality charge,. being an expense, is payable at the beginning of the perioG, whereas the whole life reserve formula
assumes deatli.s occur at the end of the year.
b) The net amount at risk is defined contractually. The traditional
definition cannot be used because the end of the year reserve (or
cash value) is not known at the time the mortality charge is due,
which is at the beginning of the time period. A common approximation 4 is to use
(9)

An alternative approximation is to include the mortality charge in the approximation, i.e.,

4
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Discounting the approximate mortality charge at interest results
in Qt x (v - (tV + P)) being the current mortality charge. Note
that i is the guaranteed rate because the current rate is unstable.
The crediting and charging is done monthly, not annually as in
the whole life reserve.

Monthly interest and mortality charges can be used directly or an
algorithmic adjustment to annual processing can shorten the computation time slightly. Eckley explains this, noting that the mortality
charge and the interest credit are constant for all 12 months of a policy year, at least in sales illustrations. The interested reader is
referred to Eckley's paper for the formulas. The recursive formulas
will work if monthly mortality is used, although the vector will be
12 times as large. A monthly interest rate is installed easily.
An accurate target premium also must include expense charges.
The succession rule must be based upon the actual administrative processing (typically done by a mainframe computer). If that processing
is in place, the actuary has to try to mimic the routines used on the
mainframe instead of establishing theory.5
There is, of course, a different succession rule when the TEFRA
corridor is in effect. To qualify as a life insurance product in the
United States and receive the attendant tax benefits, there must be a
minimum relationship between the death benefit and the cash surrender value. This is called the cash value (or TEFRA) corridor and
is 250 percent for attained ages 40 and under and gradually reduces to
100 percent at age 95. There is no sound actuarial basis for these
ratios; they are simply products of the U.S. Congress.
The most common industry response to this requirement is to
include a contractual benefit setting the death benefit equal to the
minimum of the face amount or the TEFRA corridor multiplied by the
cash surrender value. This response in turn generates a complex
NAIC6 reserve mandate that in effect requires the immediate funding
of any projected triggering of the corridor. If the cash surrender value
at the valuation date is such that its accumulation along with future
guaranteed maturity premiums will cause the death benefit to exceed
An actuary, at an earlier time, may have established the processing rule. There are
details (particularly when the minimum death benefit is in effect) such as the definition of the net amount of risk that are subject to choice. The practicing actuary then
has to mimic the succession rule that is in place.

5

6 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is an association c0nsisting of state insurance commissioners. The NAIC drafts model laws and recommends
their adoption by state legislatures. The NAIC has no legal authority to force states
to enact its recommendations.
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the face amount, the present value of the excess is added to the
reserve. In some cases the calculation has to jump between the two
rules, but usually not more than once.
The succession rule for universal life (using the approximation to
t+1 V given in equation (9» is

For the TEFRA corridor, the death benefit is the cash value times (1
+ B t ), where B t ~ O. The cash value at the end of period t+1, where
death is assumed to occur, is t+1CV, where t+1CV = (tV + P) x (1 + 0.
Thus, the net amount at risk at that time is
(l+B)(tV + P) (1 + i) - (tV +P)(1 + i) = B t x (tV + P)(1 + i).

The annual mortality charge is paid at the beginning of the year.
Hence:

5 Paid-Up Insurance Rider
The conventional paid-up addition is a single premium participating product. Each dividend then buys another portion of paid-up
insurance, which is itself participating. The effect is an increasing
amount of paid-up insurance.
A variation of this effect is a level death benefit participating
single premium whole life policy. The facilitating device is to
divide the death benefit into a one year term portion and a paid-up
portion. The dividend first pays for the next year's term insurance
with the same death benefit; any remaining dividend buys a paid-up
participating whole life benefit. If the dividend is not sufficient to
pay for the term portion, some of the paid-up could be surrendered
and the face value of the term increased. If reduced dividends continued, there will be a time when the death benefit would have to be
decreased. The initial premium rate is designed to pay for both the
term portion and the paid-up portion, thus avoiding paying for the
term in arrears.
Let P = the single premium. It buys a combination of paid-up, PU,
and a one year term insurance determined from:

PU

X

Ax+ (1 - PW x ex

=P

147

L. Timothy Giles

Life Insurance Applications of Recursive Formulas

i.e.,

The result is the exact premium that will mature the policy if
dividends are paid as projected; a daunting task by trial and
error.
There are constraints that should be noted. If the paid-up amount
were to exceed I, future premiums would not be accepted. Also, negative paid-up amounts are not admissible.

6 Recursion Formulas in APL
APL programming language is well-suited to recursive formulas,
as partial products are generated easily. A good APL technique for
accumulating nonlevel payments is to discount all of the payments to
the present, then accumulate this lump sum. The same process is used
with recursive formulas.
Refer to the first practical example of traditional whole life;

In APL,

The nonlevel payment accumulation technique described above
can be used for intermediate values of the traditional whole life
reserve:

7 Conclusion
For the past several decades, commutation functions have served
actuaries well. The more complex products of today, however, call for
new techniques. Recursive formulas may be the answer. They serve
best where the calculation involves a trajectory to a target. Even
whole life can be viewed as finding a premium to mature the policy.
The intermediate values, the reserves, follow easily. The tradition
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of valuations made with a table of stored reserve factors can be
improved. The reserves can be calculated on an as needed basis
(which is the way universal life reserves must be calculated).
Commutation functions also could be used to calculate reserves as
needed. Recursive formulas provide a second way. I hope future actuaries are as comfortable with recursive formulas as present actuaries
are with commutation functions.
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